农信社股东治理、内部人控制与风险承担——来自贵州省67家农信社的经验证据  

The Relationship of Shareholder Governance,Insider Control and Risk-Taking of Rural Credit Cooperatives--An Empirical Study Based on 67 RCCs in Guizhou

作　　者：郑六江[1] ZHENG Liujiang

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行贵阳中心支行,贵阳550001

出　　处：《农业技术经济》2020年第2期93-102,共10页Journal of Agrotechnical Economics

摘　　要：本文采用对贵州省2011-2016年的实地调研数据,运用面板数据模型检验了农信社股东治理、内部人控制与农信社风险之间的关系。结果显示,股东治理和农信社风险显著负相关,大股东可以通过指派董事、监事参与农信社公司治理,降低农信社风险。但总体上看,农信社股东在公司治理中的作用还较小,尚不能抑制内部人的过度承担风险行为。农信社内部人控制主要体现在高管对农信社的控制,高管越强势,农信社越倾向于过度承担风险。另外,独立董事制度能有效降低农信社风险,且能在一定程度上抑制高管的过度承担风险行为;市场竞争加剧会提高农信社风险,而县域经济发展水平和农信社风险显著负相关。Based on a survey on rural credit cooperatives(RCCs)in Guizhou province,this paper implements an empirical analysis study on the relationship between shareholder governance,Insider control and risk of RCCs using a panel data model.Empirical results show that shareholders’governance can lower risk-taking of RCCs.Strong stockholders can lower risk-taking of RCCs by assigning their representatives on the board of directors and board of supervisors.But shareholders haven’t played a main role in corporate governance,and can’t restrain insiders from taking risk excessively.Insider control is mainly reflected in executives’dominance in the management of RCCs,strong executives would not raise the risk of RCCs.In addition,independent directors could help to lower risk-taking of RCCs,and can to some extent restrain insiders from taking risk excessively.Fierce market competition would raise the risk of RCCs,and the level of County economic development is significantly negatively correlated with the risk of RCCs.

关 键 词：农信社 公司治理 内部人控制 风险承担 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学] F830.42