基于前景理论的协同创新机制研究  

Research on Collaborative Innovation Mechanism Based on Prospect Theory

作　　者：苏妮娜[1] 朱先奇[1] 高力平 SU Ni-na;ZHU Xian-qi;GAO Li-ping(School of Econom ics and Management,Taiyuan University of Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China;Shanxi Provincial People’s Hospital,Taiyuan 030012,China)

机构地区：[1]太原理工大学经济管理学院,山西太原030024 [2]山西省人民医院,山西太原030012

出　　处：《经济问题》2020年第3期74-82,共9页On Economic Problems

基　　金：山西省重大软科学项目“山西省创新型城市的培育与指标体系构建”(w20151020);山西省软科学项目“山西省科技型中小企业创新创业生态系统研究”(w20171015)。

摘　　要：企业选择协同创新有助于降低创新风险、充分共享创新资源。围绕政府导向下的企业与高校院所协同创新网络展开研究,引入前景理论的心理感知效用替代传统的期望效用理论,构建政府、企业和高校院所三方演化博弈模型。通过MATLAB对政府、企业和高校院所博弈演化路径和均衡点的位置变化进行数值计算,并仿真分析政府选择"激励"策略的博弈过程,讨论了企业和高校院所之间协同创新行为及相互影响的动态演变。结果表明,政府对企业和高校院所的激励力度应控制在合理范围内,以避免博弈参与主体过于依赖政策而止于研发;企业与高校院所在政府合理的监管下更容易达到创新资源的优化配置、合理控制创新成本、提高双方收益、维护协同创新的稳定发展。Enterprises choose to cooperate with external resources for innovation,which helps to reduce innovation risk and fully share innovation resources. The research centers on the collaborative innovation network between enterprises and institutions of higher learning under the guidance of the government and introduces the psychological perception utility of prospect theory to replace the traditional expected utility theory. An evolutionary game model among the government,enterprises and institutions of higher learning is established. The numerical value is calculated by using MATLAB to analyze the evolution path and the change of equilibrium point of the game among the government,enterprises and institutions of higher learning. The game process of the government choosing "incentive"strategy is simulated and analyzed. The dynamic evolution of cooperative innovation behavior and interaction between enterprises and institutions of higher learning is discussed. The results show that the incentive of government to enterprises and institutions of higher learning should be controlled within a reasonable range,so as to avoid relying too much on policy to stagnate R&D project;enterprise and institutions of higher learning under the supervision of the government’s rational,more likely to achieve the optimal allocation of innovation resources,reasonably control the cost of innovation,improve the benefits of both sides,and maintain the stable development of collaborative innovation.

关 键 词：协同创新 前景理论 政府激励 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]