考虑过度自信行为的煤矿安全监管演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coal Mine Safety Supervision Based on Overconfidence Behavior

作　　者：陈克贵[1] 谭雪萍[1] 张明慧[1] 王新宇[1] CHEN Ke-gui;TAN Xue-ping;ZHANG Ming-hui;WANG Xin-yu(School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou,Jiangsu 221116)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《商学研究》2020年第1期59-68,共10页Commercial Science Research

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目(项目编号:2017YFC0804408);国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71573252、71871215);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(项目编号:17YJC630012);江苏省社会科学基金项目(项目编号:18JD014)。

摘　　要：针对煤矿安全监管存在的问题,构建考虑煤矿安全事故发生率和煤矿企业过度自信行为的演化博弈模型,得到不同情形下演化系统所达到的均衡状态,以此探讨过度自信行为和安全事故发生率对煤矿企业与政府监管部门行为的影响机理。研究结果表明:煤矿企业的过度自信行为和安全事故发生率对政府监管部门与煤矿企业的安全监管策略的演化稳定有显著影响。此外,安全投入成本、安全监管成本及罚款等因素对安全监管的演化稳定策略也有一定影响。最后进行了演化博弈的数值模拟,验证了调节参数对行为演化的影响。本文为煤矿安全监管提供了理论支持。For the problems existing in coal mine safety supervision,an evolutionary game model considering the occurrence rate of coal mine safety accidents and the overconfidence behavior of coal mine enterprises is constructed,and the equilibrium state of the evolutionary system under different circumstances is obtained,so as to explore the influence of overconfidence behavior and accident occurrence rate on the behavior of coal mine enterprises and government supervision departments.The results show that the level of managers’overconfidence has a significant impact on the evolution and stability of the safety supervision strategies of government supervision departments and coal mining enterprises.In addition,the factors such as safety input cost,safety supervision cost and penalty also have some influence on the evolution and stabilization strategy of safety supervision.Finally,the numerical simulation of evolutionary game is carried out to verify the effect of adjustment parameters on behavior evolution.This paper provides theoretical support for coal mine safety supervision.

关 键 词：过度自信 煤矿安全监管 演化稳定策略 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F426.21[经济管理—产业经济] TD79[矿业工程—矿井通风与安全]