时效约束下基于接单意愿的众包物流激励策略  

Incentive Strategy of Crowdsourcing Logistics Based on Order Willingness under Time-sensitive

作　　者：毛玉杰 王晓锋[1] 汪宝妹 MAO Yujie;WANG Xiaofeng;WANG Baomei(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《现代信息科技》2020年第2期180-183,共4页Modern Information Technology

摘　　要：文章考虑新零售众包物流服务的预计送达时间对客户需求和社会配送骑手接单意愿的影响,建立基于时效和接单意愿的激励机制模型。分别讨论时效、订单需求对激励策略的影响。研究表明,合适的激励措施可以刺激社会配送骑手的持续参与,配送人员供需平衡条件下的激励策略能够在较大的激励系数和较小的服务定价下达到更大的平台收益,且存在最优的激励系数和服务定价使平台收益最大化。In the new retail mode,the estimated delivery time of crowdsourcing logistics(CSL)is sensitive to customer and rider.An incentive model considering time-sensitive and order willingness is constructed.This paper discusses the impact of timeliness and order requirements on incentive strategies.Studies have shown that appropriate incentives can stimulate the continued participation of social distribution riders.The incentive strategy under the balance of supply and demand of distribution personnel can achieve greater platform benefits under the larger incentive coefficient and smaller service pricing,and there are optimal incentive coefficient and service pricing to maximize the platform revenue.

关 键 词：众包物流(CSL) 预计送达时间 接单意愿 

分 类 号：TP311.5[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论]