A Hierarchical Game Model for Computation Sharing in Smart Buildings  

作　　者：Qianqian Wang Qin Wang Shi Jin Hongbo Zhu Xianbin Wang 

机构地区：[1]Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Wireless Communications,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210003,China [2]School of Software Engineering,Jinling Institute of Technology,Nanjing 211169,China [3]Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,Western University,London,ON N6A5B9,Canada [4]School of Engineering and Computing Sciences,New York Institute of Technology,New York,NY 10023,USA [5]National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,China

出　　处：《China Communications》2020年第3期188-204,共17页中国通信（英文版）

基　　金：in part by the Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61871446,61801238;the Postgraduate Research&Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province under Grant KYCX18_0887;the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province under Grant BK20170758.

摘　　要：Recently,initiatives to integrate Internet of Things(IoT)technologies into smart buildings have attracted extensive attention for improving the performance of buildings and the comfort of occupants.However,the amount of data generated by IoT devices remains a challenge to the building management systems(BMSs)in terms of intensity and complexity.Different from cloud computing and edge computing,we propose a computation sharing architecture in smart buildings to incentivize idle computing devices(ICDs,sellers)to offload computational tasks for the BMS(buyer).In this paper,we design a hierarchical game model,consisting of a Stackelberg game and a Cournot game,to achieve a dynamic increase in computational capacity for the BMS.To guarantee the utility of BMS and ICDs,the Stackelberg game model is built to analyze the interactions between BMS and ICDs.Then,the Cournot game model is presented to formulate the internal competition among multiple ICDs.Under the premise of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,the BMS can quote the optimal pricing strategy,and the ICDs can share the corresponding optimal amount of computing resources.Finally,the simulation results show that the BMS’s computational capacity is enhanced on-demand,and each participant in the game obtains maximal utility.Recently, initiatives to integrate Internet of Things(IoT) technologies into smart buildings have attracted extensive attention for improving the performance of buildings and the comfort of occupants. However, the amount of data generated by IoT devices remains a challenge to the building management systems(BMSs) in terms of intensity and complexity. Different from cloud computing and edge computing, we propose a computation sharing architecture in smart buildings to incentivize idle computing devices(ICDs, sellers) to offload computational tasks for the BMS(buyer). In this paper, we design a hierarchical game model, consisting of a Stackelberg game and a Cournot game, to achieve a dynamic increase in computational capacity for the BMS. To guarantee the utility of BMS and ICDs, the Stackelberg game model is built to analyze the interactions between BMS and ICDs. Then, the Cournot game model is presented to formulate the internal competition among multiple ICDs. Under the premise of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the BMS can quote the optimal pricing strategy, and the ICDs can share the corresponding optimal amount of computing resources. Finally, the simulation results show that the BMS’s computational capacity is enhanced on-demand, and each participant in the game obtains maximal utility.

关 键 词：COMPUTATION SHARING STACKELBERG GAME COURNOT GAME INCOMPLETE information 

分 类 号：TU855[建筑科学]