台市场的公共监管、私人监管与协同监管:一个对比研究  

Public Regulation,Private Regulation and Coordinated Regulation in Platform Markets:A Comparative Study

作　　者：王勇 刘航 冯骅[3] WANG Yong;LIU Hang;FENG Hua(Tsinghua University;Central University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]清华大学社会科学学院经济学研究所,100084 [2]中央财经大学中国互联网经济研究院、经济学院,100081 [3]清华大学民生经济研究院,100084

出　　处：《经济研究》2020年第3期148-162,共15页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71773059)的资助;国家社会科学基金重点项目(18AZD007);高等学校学科创新引智计划(B20094);北京高校卓越青年科学家计划项目(BJJWZYJH01201910034034)的资助。

摘　　要：本文通过构建动态博弈模型,从监管机制的视角对比分析了平台市场中政府和平台企业不同的监管方式对卖家质量选择与监管激励的影响。本文区分了三种不同的监管模式:(1)政府直接对卖家进行单一的公共监管;(2)平台企业对卖家进行单一的私人监管;(3)政府和平台企业对卖家进行协同监管。通过对比三种监管模式下的均衡结果以及比较静态分析结果发现:对于单一监管模式,如果平台市场规模较大,平台企业私人监管下的商品质量将高于政府公共监管的质量水平;对于协同监管模式,如果平台企业承担的连带责任较大,政府与平台协同监管下的商品质量将高于任何一种单一监管模式。另外,政府与平台的监管力度并非简单的互补或替代,两者间的关系取决于处罚强度、平台规模、连带责任等参数。最后,从监管激励角度上看,对卖家处罚强度并非越高越好,存在一个适中的强度能够最大化并且最优地协调政府和平台的监管力度。In this paper, we build a simple dynamic game model to study the strategic interactions between a government regulatory agency, platform enterprise, and online sellers, and investigate the regulatory mechanisms in an online platform market. Our main focus is on regulating the quality of the products sold on platform markets in relation to the incentives provided by different regulatory mechanisms.The regulation implemented by the government is viewed as public regulation, whereas the governance implemented by the platform is considered as private regulation. We explore three regulatory mechanisms: (Ⅰ) direct regulation by the government, where only the government supervises the sellers;(Ⅱ) self-regulation by the platform, where only the platform monitors the sellers;and (Ⅲ) coordinated regulation by the government and the platform, where the two regulatory entities supervise the online sellers, and the government also monitors the platform's supervision outcomes.In the cases of (Ⅰ) and (Ⅱ), we assume that the regulator (government or platform) first chooses the level of inspection that will be needed to determine the ex-post probability of discovering the true quality of the products sold on the platform market, and the seller then chooses the product quality levels after observing the regulator's choice of inspecting effort. If the actual quality is lower than the quality standard that is exogenously given, the regulator will fine the seller a certain amount of money, which is determined by the penalty intensity and the degree to which the actual quality is lower than the standard.In the case of (Ⅲ), the government and the platform sequentially choose the level of inspection, and the seller then chooses the product quality after observing the two levels of inspection offered. The platform will fine the seller if the quality is found to be lower than the standard. Moreover, if the government finds that the quality is lower than the standard, both the seller and the platform will be fined because of th

关 键 词：平台市场 监管机制 平台治理 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济] F203