应急管理中缘何出现"信息悖论"现象?——基于中国国家治理视角的考察  

Why Does the“Information Paradox”Occur in Emergency Management?——A Study from the Perspective of Chinese State Governance

作　　者：陈科霖 CHEN Ke-lin(Institute of Urban Governance,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518060,China)

机构地区：[1]深圳大学城市治理研究院,深圳518060

出　　处：《北京科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第2期51-54,共4页Journal of University of Science and Technology Beijing(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：研究阐释党的十九届四中全会精神国家社会科学基金重大项目“新时代完善干部担当作为的激励机制研究”;国家社会科学基金重点项目“地方官员政绩激励的生成机制与政策引导研究”(编号为16AZZ013)。

摘　　要：信息是国家治理的重要依据.中国国家治理常规机制与运动式治理机制间的矛盾深刻地体现在了日常管理与应急管理的差异之中.当下的治理逻辑必然地要求日常管理采取科层制的非人格化管理模式,对直接上级的负责制形塑了信息沿纵向逐级向上衰减的常规信息传递机制.但在应急管理机制之下,上级应对突发事件的精准决策却有赖于对真实信息的掌握,而常规机制所带来的表象性避责策略则会削弱上级的决策准确性,由此这一张力进一步形塑了中国国家治理在应急管理机制中的"信息悖论"现象.Information is an important basis for state governance.The contradiction between conventional governance mechanism and campaign-style governance mechanism is deeply reflected in the differences between daily management and emergency management in China.Centralized bureaucratical governance logic inevitably requires the daily management to adopt a non-personalized management model of the bureaucracy.Responsibility for the direct superior shapes the conventional information transfer mechanism in which information gradually decays in the vertical direction.However,under the emergency management mechanism,accurate decision-making by superiors in responding to emergencies depends on the grasp of real information,while the representational blame avoidance caused by conventional mechanisms will weaken the accuracy of decision-making by superiors.Thus,it has shaped the"Information Paradox"phenomenon of Chinese state governance in the emergency management mechanism.

关 键 词：中国国家治理 信息悖论 科层制 应急管理 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学]