基于道德风险的天使投资最优融资合约研究  

Study on the optimal angel investment financing contracts with the moral hazard problem

作　　者：牛华伟[1] 顾铭[1] Niu Huawei;Gu Ming(School of Finance,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,Jiangsu,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学金融学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《科研管理》2020年第3期110-118,共9页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71871120,2019.01-2022.12;71501099,2016.01-2018.12);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目:“基于连续时间合约理论的信用风险模型研究及其应用”(2018SJZDI101,2018.09-2021.09);江苏省“六大人才高峰”高层次人才培养资助项目(SZCY-012,2018.09-2021.08);江苏高校“青蓝工程”资助项目(2018.06-2021.06);江苏省高校优势学科三期南京审计大学应用经济学(苏政办发[2018]87号,2018.10-2021.09)。

摘　　要：作为创业企业的重要融资方式,天使投资存在显著的信息非对称,由此导致的代理问题对天使投资融资合约产生影响。基于合约理论以及考虑企业家存在的道德风险,本文建立一个理论模型,推导得到天使投资最优股权分配比例与最优融资规模的显性表达式,据此研究最优融资合约性质。理论模型表明:天使投资最优融资合约存在,且道德风险问题可以被其有效缓解;道德风险问题的加重将导致天使投资人最优股权占比与最优投资规模的降低;投资的项目越优质越能提升企业家的股权占比和获得的融资规模;良好的创业经历与能力,能够帮助创业企业家获取较高的融资额度但会降低其股权分配比例。由此,本文研究结论较好的解释了国内外天使投资的投资实践,并为天使投资合约的设计提供理论指导。The sound development and prosperity of start-up firms would be maintained for a long time in a good venture capital financing environment. As we all know, almost all the successful start-up firms at domestic and abroad have received various types of angel investment and venture capital support at the start-up stage. However, a large number of empirical studies have shown that due to significant information asymmetry between start-up firms and investors, the start-up firms are unable to raise sufficient funds to invest in all the valuable projects. From the perspective of investors, different with angel investors, venture capital funds are more inclined to invest mature companies in the growth stage and the expansion stage, but provide less support to start-up firms in the start-up stage and the seed stage. In the early stage of start-up project, small and medium-sized innovative enterprises need sufficient financial resources and technical support. In view of this and the importance of start-up firms, angel investments having startups as their main investment targets naturally become the most important financing channel for start-up firms.Similar to other financing methods, due to asymmetry of information such as the degree of work effort of entrepreneurs, there are several agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs in the entire process of angel investment. Specifically, the degree of work effort paid by the entrepreneur is unobservable and unverifiable and it could directly affect the profits of the invested start-up projects. As the setting in Holmstrom’s model, we assume that there were only two degrees of work effort: exerting effort and shirking effort. Due to asymmetry of information between investors and entrepreneurs and the assignment of firm’s assets liquidation value, entrepreneurs have incentives to obtain private benefits, which is obviously the moral hazard problem. Under this circumstance, entrepreneurs may shirk in pursuit of private benefits, leading to failure of enterprises at th

关 键 词：天使投资 道德风险 最优融资合约 创业经历 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]