企业失信行为的制度经济学分析及治理思路  

An Institutional Economics Analysis of Enterprises’Dishonest Behavior and Its Cure

作　　者：苏小方[1] 张方方[2] Su Xiaofang;Zhang Fangfang(Economics and Management School,Wuhan Univeisity,Wuhan;Economics School,Jinan University,Guangzhou)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院 [2]暨南大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2020年第2期174-181,共8页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

摘　　要：企业的经济行为选择内生于市场中的经济制度安排,其中最基本的制度规则就是产权制度。企业作为经济人,出现普遍的失信行为在表面上看是企业自身的问题,在深层次上则是在最基本的两类市场交易主体--企业和消费者之间存在的"强势产权主体-弱势产权主体"结构,这种产权结构使得企业通过失信行为侵害消费者权利成为"理性"的选择。文章认为,治理企业失信问题的根本在于纠正"强势-弱势产权主体"结构,从重塑市场交易主体平等产权地位入手,从微观角度消除失信行为产生的根源。The economic behavior of enterprises is endogenous to market institutional arrangement,the fundamental of which is the property rights system.The widespread dishonest behavior of China’s enterprises is rooted in the"strong-weak property rights entity"structure between enterprises and consumers,though it appears as a consequence of rational decision of enterprises.Therefore,the effective cure of discreditable enterprises is to correct the structure of"strong-weak property rights entity".This cure begins with reshaping the equal property right status of all market participants,and eliminating the origins of dishonest behavior from a micro perspective.

关 键 词：失信行为 产权 契约 “强-弱”结构 

分 类 号：F124.6[经济管理—世界经济]