第三方电子商务平台与加盟商家联盟稳定性的演化博弈分析  

Alliance Stability between Third-party E-commerce Platformand Cooperative Merchant Based on Evolutionary Games

作　　者：李美苓 林健[2] LI Mei-ling;LIN Jian(Management Information Department,Fujian Branch of ICBC,Fuzhou 350005,China;College of Computer and Information Sciences,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China)

机构地区：[1]中国工商银行福建省分行管理信息部,福建福州350005 [2]福建农林大学计算机与信息学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第3期1-9,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71601049);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(16YJC630064);北京市智能物流系统协同创新中心重点项目(BILSCIC-2019KF-16);福建省自然科学基金资助项目(2016J01282)。

摘　　要：针对电商平台的加盟商家的“跳单”现象,建立了第三方电子商务平台与加盟商家的博弈模型,利用演化博弈的方法分析了第三方电子商务平台的监管和加盟商家违约跳单的策略选择演化过程,给出了不同情形下他们的演化稳定均衡策略。若双方的策略不符合演化稳定均衡策略,则会影响他们形成的联盟的稳定性。此外,本文根据实际情况做了相应的参数设置和变量假设,并通过理论分析和情景仿真得到了加盟商家跳单的金额、平台因加强监管且加盟商家没有跳单而获得的额外收益等参数变化时对演化稳定均衡策略的影响。In view of“jump-dealing”phenomenon in cooperative merchant,this paper establishes the game model between third-party e-commerce platform and cooperative merchant,and analyses the evolutionary process of supervision from third-party e-commerce platform and“Jump-dealing”of cooperative merchant based on evolutionary game theory-And the evolutionary stable strategies(ESS)for this model under different circumstances are given.The stability of alliance will be affected if their strategies do not conform to the evolutionary stable strategies(ESS).In addition,parameter settings and variable hypothesis are also made according to actual situations,and how the different parameters,for example,the amount of money merchant jumping and extra revenue gained by the platform by strengthening supervision,can influence the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy is analyzed based on theoretical analysis and scenario simulation.

关 键 词：第三方电商平台 联盟稳定性 演化博弈 跳单 情景仿真 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]