消费者广告屏蔽行为对媒体平台竞争与社会福利的影响研究  被引量:12

Research on the effect of consumer ad-avoidance behaviors on the competition and social welfare of media platform

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作  者:严磊 梅姝娥[1] 仲伟俊[1] YAN Lei;MEI Shue;ZHONG Weijun(School of Economics and Management Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)

机构地区:[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出  处:《管理工程学报》2020年第1期17-24,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371050);国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL196)。

摘  要:基于双边市场理论和博弈分析方法,研究了两种典型的非对称竞争模式下消费者广告屏蔽行为对媒体平台竞争与社会福利的影响,以期为媒体运营商和相关政府管制部门提供决策参考。结果表明:在两种非对称竞争模式下,免费媒体平台的均衡广告投放量、均衡利润均随消费者广告屏蔽概率单调递增;付费媒体平台的均衡订阅费,免费媒体平台的均衡广告价格均随消费者广告屏蔽概率单调递减;与支付订阅费购买无广告服务相比,消费者宁愿遭受更多的广告干扰而选择免费媒体平台;当广告商从每个接入媒体平台的消费者处获取的边际收益大于广告给消费者带来的净负效用且两者之差较小时,消费者广告屏蔽行为将提高社会福利水平。With the rapid development of mobile internet,especially the technology of the network communication,the appearance of the new medium and the mode of transmission have been beyond the limitations of the space-time concept as well as the material property.Advertisers can obtain consumer information more quickly and easily and analyze the current consumer behaviors and future tendency.Meanwhile,they can target consumers with ads more accurately based on the strength of the information obtained through media platforms.Consumers can access media platform freely according to their preferences such as the content of the media platform,advertising,charged or not,the authority of information,etc.With the increasing ads-interference,consumers will generally shield the ads by using ads blocking software,which makes the relevant media industry suffering huge losses.To satisfy consumers’requirements of having no advertising interference and complying with the principles of“Independent,Objective,Third-party,”some media platforms use the pattern of no ads to attract consumers.Although this pattern solves the problems effectively caused by consumer ad-avoidance,it also causes the loss of consumers because of its subscription model.Two types of media platforms adopt different ad-pricing models,respectively,in the existing competitive media marketplace.The one supplies the free service to consumers and charges advertisers with a fixed amount.The other one supplies the free service to consumers and charges advertisers via the sum of pre-consumer to makes profits.Such that,it forms two types of asymmetric competition media platforms in the marketplace:“lump-sum Free VS Pay”and“per-consumer Free VS Pay.”This paper studies the impact of ad-avoidance behaviors on the media platform competition and the social welfare under the asymmetric competition pattern and discusses whether the consumers are willing to choose to enjoy the free service suffering the advertising interference or accept the charged subscriptions of no ad

关 键 词:广告屏蔽 媒体平台竞争 非对称竞争模式 社会福利 

分 类 号:F062[经济管理—政治经济学]

 

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