网约车新政下网约车平台与网约车司机的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of car-hailing industry between platforms and drivers based on new policies of car-hailing

作　　者：雷丽彩[1] 高尚 蒋艳[1] LEI Licai;GAO Shang;JIANG Yan(Business School,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China)

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2020年第1期55-62,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(19YJA630030);湖南省教育厅优秀青年项目(17B267);湖南省社科基金资助项目(17YBA369)。

摘　　要：近年来,网约车等新业态的兴起给乘客带来了新体验,同时也导致新旧矛盾交织以及利益关系碰撞。本文运用演化博弈理论分析方法,建立了新政实施背景下网约车平台和司机间的演化博弈模型,并对其博弈行为演化过程及演化稳定策略进行探讨。理论研究和仿真结果表明:政府部门对网约车市场的大力调控可以有效保护网约车平台“严格管理”的积极性,(合法营运,严格管理)成为唯一的演化稳定策略;但是当政府调控力度较小时,网约车平台“严格管理”的净收益小于其“消极管理”的净收益,使得其“严格管理”的积极性降低,从而滋长、纵容网约车司机“非法营运”行为的发生,(非法营运,消极管理)也可能成为演化博弈的稳定策略。要实现网约车平台“严格管理”率和司机“合法营运”率达到理想状态并可以长期保持,应该加大对策略对(非法营运,消极管理)的识别并给予网约车司机“非法营运”以较高的惩罚,并对网约车平台“严格管理”辅以适当的补偿措施。With the mushroomed growth of the sharing economy,platform economics represented by Airbnb,Uber,and Didi,has greatly affected all aspects of human life,especially in the area of urban residents'travel.Under the circumstance,car-hailing service also came into being.In the context of the rapid development of global information technology and the advent of the"Internet+"era,the demand for China's car-hailing market is growing.Moreover,a large number of stakeholders,such as car-hailing platforms,passengers,drivers,and traditional taxi industries are involved in the car-hailing industry.According to the behavioral decision theory,each person wants to be able to maximize its revenue,which will inevitably lead to conflicts among stakeholders.Consequently,it is of great significance to introduce and apply the control of the government to the car-hailing market.To a certain extent,the reinforcement of control will promote the healthy development of the car-hailing market.As the promulgation of car-hailing regulation and the birth of industrial monopoly giants,the car-hailing market will face more administrative licensing and fewer subsidies.In the meanwhile,a new round of the independent game is triggered among the stakeholders.Multiple stakeholders of the car-hailing market are faced with new opportunities and challenges.The requirements for car-hailing platforms and drivers are becoming more stringent.Therefore,it is necessary to study the selection behavior of evolutionary game between car-hailing platforms and drivers, which will provide a useful reference for thegovernment to play a regulatory role in maintaining the sustainable development of car-hailing service.In the first part, according to the analytical method of evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary game model between car-hailing platforms and drivers isproposed, and a payoff matrix is established. On this foundation, the replicator dynamic equations are used to depict the evolutionary path of car-hailingplatforms’ and drivers’ selection behavior unde

关 键 词：网约车运营 网约车新政 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F570[经济管理—产业经济]