不对称信息下企业污染治理外包的契约设计  

Design contracts for pollution abatement service under asymmetric information

作　　者：陈晓红[1,2] 余章美 李金霖 冯杰[1] CHEN Xiaohong;YU Zhangmei;LI Jinlin;FENG Jie(Resource-conserving&Environmental-friendly Society and Ecological Civilization 2011 Collaborative Innovation Center of Hunan Province,School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China;Institute of Big Data and Internet Innovations,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院湖南省两型社会与生态文明2011协同创新中心,长沙410083 [2]湖南工商大学大数据与互联网创新研究院,长沙410205

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2020年第2期273-283,共11页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(71501194,71502178);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71431006);教育部哲社重大攻关项目(16JZD013)。

摘　　要：本文运用委托代理理论,研究了排污企业将污染治理外包的契约设计问题.研究表明,当排污方无法准确估计治理成本,也无法观察到治污方努力水平时,排污方通过提供"对赌式"计费方式的契约菜单可以消除道德风险带来的影响,而常见的线性两部制计费方式则不能.排放标准越严格,超标惩罚越大,线性两部制计费与最优计费方式间的差距就越大.This paper studies the contract design problem for an polluter that hires a professional environmental protection company(called "EC",hereafter) to abate pollution.When the polluter can neither estimate the abatement cost nor observe the effort that the EC devotes to pollution abatement,he should provide the EC a menu of contracts with "performance security",which is a not-refundable prepayment from the EC to the polluter,to eliminate moral hazard.However,the widely used contracts with "linear two-part charging" that is composed of a fixed payment and a constant rate for each unit of pollution abatement is not as good as the contracts with "performance security".The gap between these two kinds of contracts increases when the emission standards gets stricter,or when the punishment for violating the emission standards gets higher.

关 键 词：污染治理 契约设计 逆向选择 道德风险 

分 类 号：F224.1[经济管理—国民经济]