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作 者:彭云 冯猛[2] 周飞舟[3] Peng Yun;Feng Meng;Zhou Feizhou(Chinese Public Administration Society,Beijing 100017;Department of Sociology,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234;Department of Sociology,Peking University,Beijing 100871)
机构地区:[1]中国行政管理学会,北京100017 [2]上海师范大学社会学系,上海200234 [3]北京大学社会学系,北京100871
出 处:《华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2020年第2期28-41,共14页Journal of Central China Normal University:Humanities and Social Sciences
基 金:国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“地方产业打造:制度安排与政府行为”(19FSHB009)。
摘 要:在地方治理实践中,基层干部不仅是国家与社会的双重代理人,还是拥有自身利益的“行为人”。目标管理责任制虽然有效控制了基层干部的“任务清单”,驱使其执行那些被赋予更高指标权重的任务目标,但在多任务叠加的基层治理环境中,基层干部通常基于任务属性和主观认知,将考核指标所要求的最低限度作为核心目标,形成了三种相互关联的行动取向,并在实践中表现为“实绩达标”、“名义达标”、“数字达标”,发展出差异化达标“作为”的行动逻辑。本文在“多因素聚合”思路下考察基层干部行为,一则强调基层干部在执行任务时受到的多种因素,同时将基层干部效用最大化作为其行动的立足点,突出行动的明确性,在影响因素与明确行动之间探寻其中的关联机制,并以M县精准扶贫为例,从经验层面予以验证。Street-level bureaucrats often have motivations and discretions to distort policy implementation in high-powered incentive systems due to either information asymmetry or resource constraints,but our understanding of their varying coping strategies and underlying behavioral mechanisms is limited in developing countries.How to differentiate coping strategies?What drives various coping strategies?The case of poverty alleviation in China provides an interesting context for us to explore the nature and driving forces of coping strategies among street-level bureaucrats.A list of mandatary tasks for local governments are specified by the target-based responsibility systems,which quantitatively measure their performance and bind it with pecuniary and career incentives.By using in-depth interviewing,participant observations,and archival data in the case of M county in Gansu province of northwestern China,among the nine antipoverty performance measures,we find that grassroots cadres either honestly implement the policies or partially or wholly manipulate the systems.These findings suggest that the coping strategies of street-level bureaucrats are jointly shaped by task attributes,incentive structure,and personal cognitions,which contribute to our understanding of policy implementation at local level.
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