共享经济交易主体信用策略的演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game Research on Credit Strategy of Sharing Economic Transaction Subjects

作　　者：高锡荣[1] 石颖 陈自利 GAO Xirong;SHI Ying;CHEN Zili(Center of Network Collaborative Economy Research,Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Chongqing 400065;School of Economics and Management,Neijiang Normal University,Neijiang Sichuan 641100,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆邮电大学网络协同经济研究中心,重庆400065 [2]内江师范学院经济管理学院,四川内江641100

出　　处：《重庆师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2020年第1期31-40,共10页Journal of Chongqing Normal University:Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.71601026);教育部人文和社会科学研究西部和边疆地区规划基金项目(No.18XJA630003)。

摘　　要：【目的】为有效解决共享经济平台频繁出现的违信问题。【方法】构建平台不同监管模式下供需双方的演化博弈模型,考察平台不同模式监管效应的动态演化差异。【结果】平台监管模式的变化影响供需双方的信用策略选择;只有当平台的监管强度突破阈值,方可诱使供需双方选择守信策略;监管效果以“补贴+惩罚”模式最好,“惩罚违信”模式次之,“补贴守信”模式居末。【结论】研究结果有助于指导平台优化监管模式和调节监管强度。[Purposes]In order to effectively solve the frequent breach of trust in the sharing economic platform.[Methods]The evolutionary game model of suppliers and demanders under different regulatory modes of the platform was constructed,and the dynamic evoluti on ary differences of regulatory effects under different regulatory modes of the platform were investigated.[Findings]It was shown that the change of platform supervision mode affects the choice of credit strategy of both suppliers and demanders.Only when the platform supervision intensity breaks through the threshold,can both suppliers and demanders be induced to choose the trustworthiness strategy.Supervisory effect of"subsidies plus penalties"mode was the best,followed by the penalty mode,and the subsidy mode was at the end.[Conclusions]The research was helpful to guide the platform to optimize the supervision mode and regulate the supervision intensity.

关 键 词：共享经济 平台监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F724.6[理学—数学]