信息不对称条件下金融科技监管动态博弈模型研究  

Research on Dynamic Game Model of Internet Financial Supervision under Information Asymmetry

作　　者：冯冠华[1] 司翼[2] 高飞[3] Feng Guanhua;Si Yi;Gao Fei

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学金融学院 [2]东北财经大学财政税务学院 [3]农民日报社

出　　处：《财经科学》2020年第4期14-24,共11页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：金融科技的持续健康发展与科学的金融监管密切相关。针对中国金融科技的实际情况,构建信息不对称条件下金融科技监管者与从业者之间的动态博弈模型,可以得出监管所耗费的成本、鼓励创新的手段和处置违规经营的强度等与对金融科技的监管成效存在密切的联系。监管部门应依靠对监管成本的控制优化、对金融创新的积极鼓励、对违法行为的严厉惩处等手段,来促进这一新兴业态的健康发展。The continued healthy development of financial technology is closely related to scientific financial supervision.According to the actual situation of China’s financial technology,constructing a dynamic game model between financial technology regulators and practitioners under the condition of information asymmetry can draw the cost of supervision,the means of encouraging innovation and the intensity of handling illegal operations are closely related to the supervision effectiveness of financial technology.Regulators should rely on the control optimization of regulatory costs,the positive encouragement of financial innovation,and the severe punishment of illegal activities to promote the healthy development of this new format.

关 键 词：金融科技 金融监管 动态博弈 监管策略 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]