卖空威胁、公司融资扩张战略与违规行为  

Short Selling Threats,Refinancing Pressure and Corporate Misconduct

作　　者：杨洁飞 薛熠[1] Yang Jiefei;Xue Yi

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2020年第4期41-50,共10页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国金融市场流动性危机的度量、预警和管理”(71971063);对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金“政府监管、机构博弈和市场效率学术”(CXTD9-01);研究生科研创新基金“卖空机制、定价效率与公司违规行为”(201919)。

摘　　要：利用中国推出融资融券业务的准自然实验机会,本文以2010—2016年中国A股上市公司为样本,使用双重差分模型研究放松卖空限制对企业违规行为的影响。研究发现,融券业务允许市场中的知情投资者挖掘企业负面信息进行卖空,形成有效的卖空威胁,从而震慑企业,显著降低其发生违规行为的概率。具体而言,卖空交易行为跟企业违规行为的严重程度正相关;卖空交易行为能显著降低企业的超额收益率;当企业有进一步融资需求或并购扩张战略需求时,卖空威胁对企业的震慑作用更为显著。研究表明,融券业务带来的卖空威胁是企业外部监管的重要机制。This paper investigates the causal relationship between the potential short selling and general corporate misconduct using the sample of listed companies in China’s A-share market which were punished by regulators for their irregular behavior from 2010 to 2016.The results based on the difference in difference approach show that the probability of firm misconduct decreases significantly after relaxing short-sale constraints.Short sellers are well informed and are able to detect the negative news about a firm and then to short sell.Such short selling decreases the abnormal stock return significantly thus serving as an external disciplining mechanism.The results further show that the demand for refinancing could positively promote the disciplining effect of short selling on corporate misconduct.

关 键 词：卖空压力 公司违规 融资并购 外部治理 

分 类 号：C812[社会学—统计学]