市场约束、显性存款保险制度与银行风险承担——基于回归控制法的研究  

Market Discipline,Explicit Deposit Insurance System and Bank Risk-taking Behavior——Based on the Regression Control Method

作　　者：郜栋玺 GAO Dongxi

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《金融监管研究》2020年第2期35-50,共16页Financial Regulation Research

基　　金：“利率市场化视角下的货币政策风险承担渠道问题研究”(项目编号71573224);“广东省普通高校基础研究与应用基础研究重点项目”(项目编号2017WZDXM030);“广东省普通高校创新团队(资产管理研究团队)项目”(项目编号2018WCXTD004)的资助。

摘　　要：基于我国利率市场化进程日趋完善和新推出显性存款保险制度的金融大背景,本文从市场约束与显性存款保险制度的视角,将显性存款保险制度政策视为一个“准自然实验”,采用2010~2016年的面板数据,研究了存款保险制度及其与市场约束的相互作用对银行风险承担的影响,并藉此评价了其政策效应。研究结果表明:(1)我国不同类别商业银行的两类市场约束效应存在较大差别。就价格约束效应而言,对地方银行显著有效,而对全国性银行和外资银行则不显著;就数量约束效应而言,三类银行均不显著。(2)基于回归控制法的估计结果表明,存款保险制度的实施对银行风险承担有显著的正向影响,且其对地方银行的冲击强于全国性银行。(3)进一步基于非线性双重差分的估计结果显示,存款保险制度显著弱化了市场约束对银行风险承担的负向影响,表明我国存款保险制度的政策影响逐渐开始发挥出来。Based on the increasing marketization of the interest rate and the new financial system of the explicit deposit insurance system,this paper begins from the perspective of the market discipline and explicit deposit insurance system and regards the explicit deposit insurance system as a quasi-natural experiments,using the panel data during 2010-2016 to study the impact of deposit insurance system and its interactions with market discipline on bank risk-taking behaviors to evaluate its policy effects.The results show that:(1)The two types of market discipline effects exist significant differences in different types of commercial banks in China.In terms of price discipline,local banks are significantly efficient,except large banks and foreign banks.But all their quantity disciplines are not significant.(2)The deposit insurance system has a significant positive impact on banks'risktaking behaviors,and the impacts on the local banks is stronger than that of national banks.(3)Furthermore,the deposit insurance system significantly decreases the negative impact that the market discipline has on banks'risktaking behaviors.It indicates that the explicit deposit insurance system gradually plays its important role.

关 键 词：市场约束 存款保险制度 银行风险承担 回归控制法 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]