基于法律实证主义的裁判理论:形成、预设与局限  

Legal Positivism and Its Theory of Jurisdiction:Formation,Presupposition and Limits

作　　者：赵英男[1] ZHAO Ying-nan(School of Law,Peking University,Beijing,100871)

机构地区：[1]北京大学法学院,北京100871

出　　处：《齐齐哈尔大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第4期101-105,共5页Journal of Qiqihar University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目:构建中国特色案例制度的综合系统研究(16ZDA068)。

摘　　要：法律实证主义作为一套有关“法律是什么”以及“我们为何遵守法律”的学说,在捍卫其核心立场“社会事实命题”的过程中,逐步发展出一套围绕“文义/目的解释、疑难/简易案件、法官自由裁量/法律客观性”这三组二元对立构造为核心的司法裁判学说。该裁判理论接受了法律实证主义有关“法律是什么”的解答,作为理论论辩过程中产生的衍生品,只具有为法律实证主义立场辩护的理论意义,而丧失了对于司法实践的充分解释力。Legal positivism is a legal theory about“what law is”and“Why we should obey law”.In the process of defending its core thesis,namely the social facts thesis,it comes to develop a special theory of jurisdiction based on three dichotomies:plain meaning or purpose interpretation,hard or easy cases,judges’discretion or objectivity of law.This kind of theory of jurisdiction accepts the answer to“what law is”from legal positivism.What a pity is,it is merely a by-product of theoretical debates for defending legal positivism,and could not sufficiently explain our legal practice.

关 键 词：法律实证主义 社会事实命题 裁判理论 表象主义 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]