基于演化博弈的蜜罐有效性机理证明  

Proof of Honeypot Effectiveness Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：李阳 赵俊楠 石乐义[1] LI Yang;ZHAO Jun-nan;SHI Le-yi(School of Computer&Communication Engineering,China University of Petroleum,Qingdao 266580,China)

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(华东)计算机与通信工程学院,山东青岛266580

出　　处：《计算机技术与发展》2020年第4期105-109,共5页Computer Technology and Development

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61772551);山东省自然科学基金(ZR2019MF034)。

摘　　要：借鉴自然界生物演变进化过程中复制动态的思想,基于演化博弈对蜜罐技术的有效性机理进行研究,分析网络中攻防双方如何根据自身行动策略及支付函数进行演变,从而使博弈收益最大化。演化博弈从一种全新角度诠释了博弈均衡概念,不再是完全理性也非完全信息,为纳什均衡和均衡战略的选择演绎出新方法。演化博弈过程中,防御方是包括普通服务和蜜罐的混合系统,其对手是访问混合系统的恶意攻击者,双方构成了博弈参与者。混合网络系统可看作一个生态系统,而来访者则只有攻击者一个种群;混合系统持续为来访者提供服务,攻击者可选择访问或不访问。论文基于复制动态方程推理计算满足演化稳定策略的均衡点,并利用Matlab平台仿真验证博弈双方的策略演变趋势,从而在理论上证明了蜜罐技术的有效性机理。Inspired by the dynamic replication in biological evolution,we study the inherent effectiveness of honeypot based on the evolutionary game theory,and discuss how the attacker and the defender in the network evolve according to their own action strategies and payment functions,so as to maximize the benefits in the game.The game illustrates conception of equilibriums and develops a new method for Nash equilibrium and strategy,with neither completely rationality nor information.The defender can be regarded as a hybrid system,including the general system and honeypot system while the adversary is the attacker with malicious access to the hybrid system.Both of them form out game players.The hybrid network system is considered to be an ecosystem,and the attacker has only one population.The hybrid system has been providing services to visitors who can choose to access or not access the system.In this paper,the equilibrium point of evolution stable strategy based on replicator dynamics equation is satisfied through evolutionary reasoning,and the strategy evolution trend of the partners in the game is verified through Matlab simulation,which proves the effective mechanism of the honeypot technology theoretically.

关 键 词：演化博弈 蜜罐 有效性 演化稳定策略 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：TP393.06[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]