海绵城市PPP项目中政府与企业的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Government and Enterprise in PPP Project of Sponge City

作　　者：毕然 Bi Ran(Graduate School,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China;University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京102488 [2]中国社会科学院大学,北京102488

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2020年第5期144-151,共8页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金“经济发展方式转变成效评价研究及其实证分析”(项目编号:11BTJ015);中国社会科学院“哲学社会科学创新工程基础学者”资助计划。

摘　　要：为了解决海绵城市PPP项目中政府与私人企业间因信息不对称所引发的道德问题,本文在HM委托代理模型中引入监督机制,建立了完全理性和有限理性两种情形下的地方政府私人企业的激励监督模型,并对模型的均衡解进行了算例分析。研究发现:同时引入激励机制和监督机制可以促使私人企业更好履行合约;私人企业的最优努力水平与地方政府的激励水平、监督水平正相关;当代理人私人企业具有公平互惠偏好时,地方政府给与私人企业更多的“恩惠”,在特定条件下,双方的效用可以得到改善。本文将监督和激励机制纳入博弈中,为地方政府在海绵城市PPP项目的决策上提供了参考,并进一步完善了生态环境PPP理论。To solve the moral hazard caused by information asymmetry between government and private enterprises in sponge city PPP project,this paper introduces supervision mechanism into HM principal-agent model,establishes incentive and supervision model of local government-private enterprises in two situations of complete rationality and limited rationality,and gives an exa-mple of equilibrium solution of the model.It is found that:the establishment of incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism can promote private enterprises to better fulfill contracts.The optimal effort level of private enterprises is positively related to the incentive level and supervision level of local governments.When have reciprocal preferences,the government can provide more inte-rests to exchange private enterprises'extra efforts and the effectiveness of both sides will be improved under certain conditions.In this paper,supervision and incentive mechanism are included in the game,which provides a reference for local governments in the decision-making of PPP projects in sponge cities,and improves the PPP theory in ecological environment.

关 键 词：海绵城市 委托代理模型 道德风险 互惠偏好 激励机制 监督机制 

分 类 号：F294[经济管理—国民经济] F224