考虑随机需求和零售商销售努力的两级供应链的渠道选择  

Channel Selection of Two-echelon Supply Chain Considering Random Demand and Retailer’s Sales Effort

作　　者：范贺花 周永卫 武大勇 Fan Hehua;Zhou Yongwei;Wu Dayong(College of Science,Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics;Collaborative Innovation Center for Aviation Economic Development of Henan Province,Zhengzhou 450015,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州航空工业管理学院理学院 [2]航空经济发展河南省协同创新中心,郑州450015

出　　处：《统计与决策》2019年第10期41-46,共6页Statistics & Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(11501525);航空科学基金资助项目(2016ZG55019,2017ZD55014);河南省教育厅自然科学基金资助项目(16A630061);河南省科技攻关计划项目(182102110129);河南省高等学校青年骨干教师资助计划(2015GGJS-179);河南省大学生创新创业训练计划(201710485025,201810485002);河南省杰出青年基金资助项目(184100510004);郑州航院青年基金资助项目(2017113001);郑州航院2015、2016年度青年骨干教师资助计划。

摘　　要：针对由单个生产商和单个零售商所构成的供应链系统,生产商和零售商所面对的市场需求均为随机需求,且需求与零售商的销售努力及零售商、制造商的销售价格相关,文章构建了一个生产商主导的两级供应链博弈模型,求解得到不同渠道结构下零售商的销售努力水平、零售渠道销售价格、直销渠道价格。最后对比分析了分散决策和集中决策模式,提出了一个缓解渠道冲突、能够使生产商和零售商达到共赢状态的二部线性契约,得到了生产商和零售商进行合作时的批发价格区间,证明了在这个区间内,二者所商定的批发价格越低,零售商给予生产商利润转移支付的空间越大。In a supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, the market demand that manufacturers and retailers face is random demand, which is related to the retailer’s sales effort and to both the retailer’s and manufacturer’s sales price. In view of this, the paper constructs a game model of two-echelon supply chain dominated by manufacturers,solving the retailer’s sales effort level, retail channel sales price and direct channel price under different channel structures. Finally, the paper compares and analyzes the decentralized decision model and centralized decision model, and proposes a bipartite linear contract to alleviate channel conflict and achieve a win-win situation between manufacturer and retailer, deriving the wholesale price range when the manufacturer and retailer cooperate, and proving that within this range, the lower the agreed wholesale price, the more room the retailer gives the producer for profit transfer payments.

关 键 词：随机需求 销售努力 二部线性契约 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]