FeW的差分故障攻击  

Differential fault attack on FeW

作　　者：谢敏[1] 李嘉琪 田峰 XIE Min;LI Jiaqi;TIAN Feng(State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks,Xidian University,Xi’an 710071,China)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学综合业务网理论及关键技术国家重点实验室,陕西西安710071

出　　处：《通信学报》2020年第4期143-149,共7页Journal on Communications

基　　金：国家重点研发计划基金资助项目(No.2018YFE0126000);国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.U1636209);陕西省重点研发计划基金资助项目(No.2019ZDLGY13-07,No.2019ZDLGY13-04)。

摘　　要：为了评估轻量级分组密码算法FeW的安全性,提出并讨论了一种针对FeW算法的差分故障攻击方法。该方法采用单字节随机故障模型,选择在FeW算法的最后一轮右侧引入单字节随机故障,利用线性扩散函数的特点获取差分信息,并基于S盒差分分布统计规律实现密钥恢复。实验结果表明,平均47.73次和79.55次故障注入可以分别完全恢复FeW-64-80和FeW-64-128的主密钥,若在恢复密钥过程中加入210的穷举计算,所需平均故障注入次数分别降至24.90和41.50。该方法可以有效地攻击FeW算法。In order to evaluate the security of the lightweight block cipher FeW,a differential fault attack method was proposed and discussed using a single byte random fault model.In this method,a single byte random fault was introduced on the right side of the last round of FeW to recover the key based on the statistical characteristics of S-box difference distribution,and the difference information was obtained using the characteristics of the linear diffusion function.The experiment results show that the complete key recovery can be achieved with an average of 47.73 and 79.55 fault injections for FeW-64-80 and FeW-64-128 respectively.If 210 exhaustive calculations are added to the key recovery process,the number of average fault injections required can be reduced to 24.90 and 41.50.This attack is effective on FeW.

关 键 词：FeW算法 轻量级分组密码 差分故障攻击 单字节故障模型 

分 类 号：TP309.2[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]