政绩考核与地方财政支出:以江苏“县级人民政府教育督导和考核”改革为例  

Performance Evaluation and Local Fiscal Expenditure A Case Study Based on Reform of"County Government Education Supervision and Evaluation in Jiangsu"

作　　者：王峥 WANG Zheng(Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学经济学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《兰州财经大学学报》2020年第1期93-101,共9页Journal of Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2015SJB009)。

摘　　要：我国地方政府官员面临的考核压力不仅来自经济增长,也来自教育等非经济方面。地方官员面临的非经济层面的政绩考核,同样会对地方财政支出造成影响。文章利用“自然实验”的思想,以2005年江苏省开始的“县级人民政府教育督导和考核”改革为例,分析了自上而下的政绩考核压力对县级教育支出的影响。实证表明:尽管财政分权对县级教育支出存在显著的负面影响,但人均义务教育支出越低的县区,面临的政绩考核压力越大,财政支出比重增加更为显著。因此,改革官员考核体制与地方预算管理体制,对于扭转地方财政长期的经济支出偏向以及行政主导型的预算体制都具有深远的意义。The local government officials in China not only receive a pressure from an evaluation for economic growth,but also face one from education among other non-economic aspects.The review of non-economic performance faced by local officials composes an impact on local fiscal expenditures.Using the idea of"natural experiment"and taking the reform of"education supervision and evaluation of county government"which started in Jiangsu province in 2005 as an example,this paper analyzes the influence of the top-down pressure of performances evaluation on education expenditure of a county.The empirical evidences show that although fiscal decentralization has a significant negative impact on education expenditure of a county.The lower the per capita expenditure on compulsory education in a county,the bigger the pressure from performance evaluation in the county is,in which the increase in the proportion of fiscal expenditure is greater.Thus it is of far-reaching significance to reform the officers'evaluation system and the local budget management system to reverse the long-run profitable bias in local fiscal expenditure and the government-dominated budget system.

关 键 词：政绩考核 双重差分 财政支出 官员考核 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]