反腐败与政治信任:结构偏好与规模偏好的影响差异  

Anti-Corruption and Political Trust:Difference Between Effect of Structural Preference and Scale Preference

作　　者：季程远 孟天广[2] JI Chengyuan;MENG Tianguang(School of International and Public Affairsf Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai,20030,China;Department of Political Science,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院,上海200030 [2]清华大学政治学系,北京100084

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第2期99-112,共14页Journal of Shanghai Jiao tong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目(19CZZ012);浦江人才计划项目(2019PJC065).

摘　　要：面对腐败蔓延不断侵蚀政府能力和政权治理合法性的挑战,世界各国政府致力于通过反腐败行动提高公众政治信任,强化政权支持。为了达成这一目标,政府通过扩大反腐败的规模和调整反腐败对象的结构以向社会释放其打击腐败的目标和决心,因此,反腐败的规模偏好和结构偏好就成为向公众宣传反腐绩效和警示潜在腐败分子的重要途径。本文以十八大以来的反腐败为例,综合利用2015年中国城市治理调查和2012-2015年地方反腐落马官员数据集,发现两种反腐败偏好对于公众政治信任存在影响差异,并探讨了三个中介因素的作用机制,包括公众对反腐败行动的满意度、对政府的清廉感知、对政府权力约束能力的评价。具体而言,查处更多官员会通过上述三种机制显著提高政治信任,查处地方政府高级官员同样会通过提高清廉感知的方式提高政治信任,但反腐败满意度将短期内降低。公众反腐败期望满足假说有利于理解本研究的发现,随着反腐败斗争的常态化和监察制度的完善,公众期望逐渐与之相适应,政治信任将得到持续提升。Facing the challenges of the spread of corruption and the erosion of government capacity and the legitimacy of government governance, governments all over the world are committed to increasing public political trust and strengthening political support through anti-corruption actions. To achieve this goal, the Chinese government expands the scale of anti-corruption and adjusts the structure of anti-corruption objects to release to the society its goals and determination to fight corruption. Therefore, the scale preference and structure preference of anti-corruption has become important ways to publicize anti-corruption performance and to warn potential corrupters. Taking the anti-corruption since the 18 th National Congress of the CPC as an example, this paper determines the fact that the two anti-corruption preferences have different impacts on public political trust, and discusses the mechanism of three intermediary factors, including public satisfaction with anti-corruption actions, perception of government integrity, and evaluation of the restraint to government power, by using the 2015 China Urban Governance Survey and the 2012-2015 Database of Anti-corruption Investigated Officials. Specifically, investigating more officials will significantly increase political trust through the three mechanisms mentioned above, and investigating senior local government officials will also increase political trust by increasing the perception of integrity, but anti-corruption satisfaction will be reduced in the short term. Public anti-corruption expectation fulfillment hypothesis is conducive to understanding the findings in this paper. With the normalization of the anti-corruption struggle and the improvement of the supervision system, the public expects to adapt to it, and political trust will continue to improve.

关 键 词：反腐败 结构偏好 规模偏好 政治信任 中介分析 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学]