信息非对称环境下产业创新平台多方主体博弈分析  

Analysis of Multi-party Game of Industrial Innovation Platform under Information Asymmetry Environment

作　　者：曹玉红[1] 尤建新[2] CAO Yu-hong;YOU Jian-xin(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第4期78-85,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71871134);上海市软科学研究计划重点项目(18692104400);安徽省社会科学创新发展重大项目(2018ZD013)。

摘　　要：研究产业创新平台在多方主体模式下的协同合作策略问题。我国产业创新平台发展时间较短,部分平台系统的资源共享和服务能力处于“弱势”,但通过多方主体协同合作能有效提升平台系统的技术创新水平,所以主体间的博弈会影响平台系统的存续质量与运行效率。基于此,本文构建了信息非对称环境下“产业链相关企业-各类研究型机构-政府管理部门”主要三方主体的静态博弈模型,从利益实现机制出发,强化各方主体在产业创新平台运行中的理性,以破解产业创新平台运行效率低下困局。研究表明,企业、研究机构和政府管理部门是否会严格遵循契约治理规范自身行为主要取决于各自的资源共享力度、资源共享成本以及资源共享的收益。This paper studies the collaborative cooperation strategy of the industrial innovation platform under the multi-agent model. China’s industrial innovation platform has a relatively short development time, and the resource sharing and service capabilities of some platform systems are in a weak position, but cooperation among multiple parties can effectively improve the technological innovation level of platform. Therefore, the inter-subject game will affect the quality and operating efficiency of the platform system. Based on this, this paper constructs a static game model for the main tripartite entities of "enterprises-research institutions-government management departments" under the asymmetric environment of information. The study starts from the interest realization mechanism and strengthens all parties rationality to break the predicament of the industrial innovation platform’s low operation efficiency. The research shows that whether companies, research institutions, and government agencies strictly follow the behavior of contract governance norms mainly depends on their respective resource sharing efforts, resource sharing costs, and the benefits of resource sharing.

关 键 词：产业创新平台 利益实现机制 信息非对称 多方主体博弈 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]