全面抗战时期八路军作战原则探析  

An Analysis of the Eighth Route Army's Operational Principles during the Total War of Resistance

作　　者：邹铖[1] Zou Cheng

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学历史学系

出　　处：《抗日战争研究》2020年第1期26-41,M0003,共17页Studies of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression

摘　　要：从全面抗战爆发至1941年,对敌后作战原则问题,中共高层存在看法上的微妙差异。毛泽东虽然不排斥运动战,但显然更坚持游击战的方针,彭德怀等人则在游击战外,更加强调运动战的必要性。正因此,1941年前八路军在作战上不可免地带有一些运动战色彩。前方所以长期重视运动战,关键在于很长时期没有完全摸清日军战斗力的底。而毛泽东所以信赖游击战,却对前方的运动战予以包容,和没有完全摸清日军战斗力的底也不无关系。随着百团大战结束,中共高层普遍意识到此时与日军进行过多、过大规模运动战尚不现实。1941年底,坚持游击战的方针成为共识。From the outbreak of the Total War of Resistance to 1941,there were subtle differences in the views of the CPC high level to the operational principles behind enemy lines.Although Mao Zedong did not reject mobile warfare,he was obviously more committed to the policy of guerrilla warfare,while Peng Dehuai and others,beside guerrilla warfare,putting more emphasis on the necessity of mobile warfare.As a result,the Eighth Route Army had some color of mobile warfare in its operations before 1941.The key factor was that in a long period the frontline did not completely understand the combat effectiveness of the Japanese Army.The reason of Mao Zedong,who preferred to the guerrilla warfare,tolerating the mobile warfare in the frontline,also related to the fact of not completely understanding the combat effectiveness of the Japanese Army.With the end of the Hundred-Regiment Campaign,the CPC high level generally realized that it was not realistic to carry out excessive and large-scale mobile warfare with the Japanese at the time,and it became a consensus to the principle of guerrilla warfare.

关 键 词：毛泽东 彭德怀 运动战 游击战 

分 类 号：D23[政治法律—政治学]