财政补贴、法律监督与地方投融资平台代理成本  

Government Subsidy,Legal Supervision and Local Government Financing Platform’s Agency Cost

作　　者：李昊洋 程小可[2] 李馨子[3] Li Haoyang;Cheng Xiaoke;Li Xinzi(Donlinks School of Economics and Management,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jjiaotong University,Bejjing 100044;School of Accounting,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081)

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学东凌经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [3]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《管理评论》2020年第4期21-34,共14页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71572009,71872010,71372011)。

摘　　要：在"去杠杆"政策背景下,规范地方投融资平台运营对我国经济平稳发展至关重要。本文基于委托代理理论,采用2007-2015年间公开发行债券的地方投融资平台作为样本,实证分析了财政补贴对地方投融资平台代理成本产生的影响以及法律监督在其间所起的调节作用,并比较了该影响在不同层级投融资平台间的差异。研究发现,财政补贴提高了投融资平台代理成本,降低了经营效率,但法律监督的加强能够使这种现象得到缓解,并且由于不同层级平台间制度建设与管理层晋升激励强度存在差异,使得这种情况在较低层级地方投融资平台中更为明显。进一步研究发现,以上情况主要存在于管理层从事机会主义行为能力或动机较强的样本中。Against the background of the deleveraging policy,regulating local government financing platform operation is important for China’s economic development. Based on "Principal-agency Theory",this paper uses the local government financing platforms that issued debt between 2007-2015 to investigate the relationship among government subsidy,legal supervision and local government financing platform’s agency cost,and compare difference of this relationship in various local government financing platforms. The results show that government subsidy increases the agency cost of local government financing platforms,decreases the operation efficiency,but legal supervision relieves it. And this phenomenon is more significant in lower level local government financing platforms. Additionally,those relationships are more pronounced where the management has a strong capability or motivation to take opportunist actions.

关 键 词：财政补贴 代理成本 法律监督 投融资平台 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F832.39[政治法律—中外政治制度] F830.42[经济管理—金融学] F812.45