Wittgenstein’s Peculiar Use of“Internal Relation”in Aspect-Seeing  

作　　者：ZHANG Ligeng 

机构地区：[1]Institute of Philosophy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2020年第1期143-159,共17页中国哲学前沿（英文版）

摘　　要：“Internal relation”is a significant term in both Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy.The term is used in relation to many problems,including our topic here,“aspect-seeing.”Some scholars have attempted to present a persuasive interpretation of this terminology;however,Wittgenstein’s remarks on“aspect-seeing”somehow thwart their approaches.The obstacle lies in the relata involved:Which terms are connected by an internal relation in the perception of an aspect?In this paper,I review the existing interpretations and present two proposals,one of which is conservative and the other slightly more radical.I argue that Wittgenstein makes divergent use of the distinction between“intemal/extemal relations,”and that this may reveal the potential ambiguities of the words“internal”and“relation”

关 键 词：aspect-seeing intemal/extemal RELATIONS WITTGENSTEIN 

分 类 号：H00[语言文字—语言学]