持续经营审计意见、市场环境与盈余管理  

Going Concern Opinions,Market Environment and Earnings Management

作　　者：邢春玉 张立民[2] 张莉[1] XING Chunyu;ZHANG Limin;ZHANG Li(School of Information Management,Beijing Information Science&Technology University,Bejing 100192,China;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)

机构地区：[1]北京信息科技大学信息管理学院,北京100192 [2]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2020年第2期11-21,共11页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL051);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(20YJAZH129);北京市社会科学和北京市教委社会科学计划重点项目(SZ202011232024);北京信息科技大学学校科研基金(2035011)。

摘　　要：基于审计需求的代理理论,研究差异化的市场环境作用下持续经营审计意见与盈余管理之间的关系。研究发现:持续经营审计意见导致管理层利用应计利润和真实活动进行盈余管理,非国有企业相对于国有企业更善于利用隐蔽性较高的真实活动进行盈余管理;并购事件的发生,会削弱持续经营审计意见下的盈余管理行为;当首次收到持续经营审计意见时,管理层倾向于利用应计利润的操纵进行盈余管理,随着被出具持续经营审计意见的次数增多,管理层转而利用隐蔽性较高的真实活动进行盈余管理。市场环境越透明,市场化程度越高,越能抑制持续经营审计意见下的盈余管理。Based on the agency theory of audit demand, this paper studies the relationship between GCO and earnings management under the effect of differentiated market environment. Study finds that GCO can lead to management using accrued profits and real activities for earnings management. Compared with state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises are better at using real activities with high concealment for earnings management. The occurrence of M & A events will weaken the earnings management behavior under GCO. When receiving GCO for the first time, the management tends to use the manipulation of accrued profit to carry out earnings management. With the increase of the number of times when GCO is issued, the management turns to the real activities with high concealment to carry out earnings management. The more transparent the market environment and the higher the degree of marketization, the more likely it is to suppress earnings management under GCO.

关 键 词：持续经营审计意见 应计项盈余管理 真实活动盈余管理 市场环境 资本市场 新证券法 持续经营活动 注册制改革 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]