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作 者:苏妮娜[1] 朱先奇[1] 史竹琴[2] SU Nina;ZHU Xianqi;SHI Zhuqin(College of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China;College of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Science and Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China)
机构地区:[1]太原理工大学经济管理学院,山西太原030024 [2]太原科技大学经济管理学院,山西太原030024
出 处:《工业工程与管理》2020年第2期118-124,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management
基 金:山西省重大软科学项目(w20151020);山西省软科学项目(w20171015)。
摘 要:技术共享有助于形成稳定的企业创新联盟。研究围绕科技型中小企业之间协同创新网络展开研究,构建企业之间基于有限理性假设的演化博弈模型。并通过研究企业之间协同创新博弈的演化路径和均衡点的位置,得到系统演化的数值解及不同初始创新概率下策略演化趋势,讨论了企业之间技术共享行为及相互影响的博弈演化过程。结果表明:参与技术共享协同创新的企业技术外化程度和吸收能力都会影响协同创新联盟技术资源的共享,并且企业选择博弈的初始意愿越接近均衡策略点,达成联盟稳定的周期越长。Technology sharing helps to build a stable enterprise innovation alliance.In order to study the cooperative innovation mechanism of small and medium-sized technological enterprises,an evolutionary game model based on bounded rationality assumption was constructed.By studying the evolutionary path and equilibrium point of cooperative innovation game among enterprises,the numerical solution of system evolution and the evolutionary trend of innovation strategy under different initial probability were obtained.The behavior of technology sharing among enterprises and its influence on the evolution of game were discussed.The results show that the degree of technology externalization and absorptive capacity of enterprises participating in technology sharing will affect the sharing of technology resources in collaborative innovation alliance.At the same time,the closer the initial intention of the enterprise is to the equilibrium strategy point,the longer the period of reaching alliance stability is.
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