基于服务保证的双寡头服务质量水平竞争模型  

Model of Duopoly Competition on Service Quality Levels Based on Service Guarantee

作　　者：王武 毛湛玉 经有国[2] 孙力 WANG Wu;MAO Zhan-yu;JING You-guo;SUN Li(Student Community Education Management Center,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650500;Faculty of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学学生社区教育管理中心,云南昆明650500 [2]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明650093

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2020年第3期32-35,共4页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71461014);云南省基础研究计划面上项目(2019FB087)。

摘　　要：服务质量水平是客户决定是否购买服务产品的重要因素,向客户提供服务保证是企业的有效营销策略和竞争手段。针对双寡头垄断市场的服务质量水平竞争问题,假设两家寡头企业具有完全相同的成本特征,提供的服务产品无差异,在此基础上建立了两家寡头企业基于服务保证竞争的需求函数和目标利润函数模型,应用博弈方法求解得出了以下结论:存在唯一纳什均衡解,且双方的最优服务质量水平相等。对最优服务质量水平与有关参数进行了相关性分析,可为企业的经营决策提供重要理论依据。最后应用算例分析对所提出模型的有效性进行了验证。Service quality level is an important factor of customer to decide whether to buy the service products,and to provide customers with service guarantee is an effective marketing strategy and competition tool of enterprises. Aiming at the duopoly competition problem of service quality level,providing the two duopolyenterprises having the same cost characteristics and the service products provided having no difference,the demand functions and target profit functions of the two enterprises are established. Then game theory are applied and the following conclusions are obtained: existing unique Nash equilibrium and equivalent optimal service quality levels. The correlation analysis between the optimal service quality level and related parameters is conducted,which can be provide important theoretical basis for the management and decision-making of the enterprises. The example analysis is employed to validatethe effectiveness of the proposed model.

关 键 词：服务保证 服务质量水平 双寡头垄断 博弈 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]