基于演化博弈的政企联合应急储备决策研究  

Study on Decision-making of Government-Enterprise Joint Emergency Reserve Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：张乃平[1] 张钰林 ZHANG Naiping;ZHANG Yulin(School of Safety Science and Emergency Management,WUT,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学安全科学与应急管理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2020年第2期98-102,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家重点研发计划基金项目(2018YC0807000)。

摘　　要：针对政企联合应急储备过程中双方决策行为对联合应急储备效率存在影响的问题,利用影响决策行为的政府政策性优惠、企业储备成本、企业违约金、政府补偿等因素构建模型,并对双方决策行为进行演化博弈分析。结果表明,企业违约金、政府补偿等与联合储备效率正相关;企业储备成本与联合储备效率负相关;政府政策性优惠不会对联合应急储备产生影响。上述研究结论可为政府部门提供相关决策支持。Research on the impact of decision-making behaviors of both parties on the efficiency of the joint emergency reserve during the joint emergency reserve of government and enterprises.Based on the factors influencing the decision-making behavior such as government policy preference,enterprise reserve cost,enterprise liquidated damages and government compensation,the model is constructed and the evolutionary game analysis is carried out for the decision-making behavior of both sides.The results show that liquidated damages and government compensation are positively correlated with joint reserve efficiency.The enterprise reserve cost is negatively correlated with the joint reserve efficiency.Changes such as government policy preferences will not affect the joint emergency reserve.This research conclusion can provide relevant decision support for government departments.

关 键 词：联合储备 应急物资 演化博弈 政企合作 决策行为 

分 类 号：F202[经济管理—国民经济]