从实践哲学看归纳问题  

New Possible Explanation of Induction in the Perspective of Philosophy of Scientific Practices

作　　者：吴彤[1] WU Tong(Department of the History of Science,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学科学史系,北京100084

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2020年第4期15-18,共4页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“科学实践哲学与地方性知识研究”(13&ZD068)。

摘　　要：所有传统科学哲学对于归纳问题的讨论,都是由于把科学知识看做为全称肯定判断命题的集合而带来了问题求解的困境。归纳问题只存在于全称的普遍性判断的形式逻辑中。它是哲学家在语义分析时用理想化的方式看待科学研究时带来的问题。在科学实践哲学的观点下,归纳后的结论仍然不是普遍性的结论,而是一种实践语境论下的一般性结论。当把结论限定在某事物的局域内,归纳的不确定性和可靠性会得到改善。There is a dilemma for inductive problem discussed in all of the traditional philosophy of science,due to the scientific knowledge is regarded as a set of universal positive propositions.Inductive problem exists only in the formal logic of the universal judgment.It arises when philosophers idealize scientific research in semantic analysis.From the view of philosophy of scientific practices,the inductive conclusion is still not universal,but a general conclusion under the theory of practical context.When the conclusion is confined to the locality of something,the uncertainty and reliability of induction will be improved.

关 键 词：归纳 求解困境 情境 科学实践哲学 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]