从时间现象学看思维的电影机制——兼论计算机记忆系统中滞留的缺失  

The Cinematographical Mechanism of Thought from the Perspective of Time Phenomenology:On the Lack of Retention in Computer Memory Systems

作　　者：陶建文 TAO Jian-wen(School of Marxism,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学马克思主义学院,广州510640

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2020年第4期72-76,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：广州市哲学社会科学规划项目(15G01)。

摘　　要：柏格森认为电影的运动感实际上是一种虚幻的感知,他进一步对思维中的电影机制进行了批判。柏格森的批判可以用胡塞尔的时间现象学加以解析,思维的电影机制中的影像、表象等,相当于胡塞尔从对滞留的现象学描述中区分出来的“回忆”,“回忆”串连起来的心理学时间完全不同于“滞留”所构成的活生生的当下感知,由此可论及计算机的记忆问题,计算机记忆系统充其量相当于人的“回忆”,它不可能具有人的内时间意识中的“滞留”能力。Bergson once criticized the movement of the film and believed that the movement of the film is actually an illusory perception,instead of a perception of real movement,and thus he further criticized the cinematographical mechanism of Thought.Bergson's criticism can be completely analyzed by Husserl's time phenomenology.The images and representations in the cinematographical mechanism of thought are equivalent to Husserl's“memory”from the phenomenological description of retention.The psychological time connected in series of memories is completely different from the living current perception of“retention”.From this we can talk about the memory problem of computer.Computer memory systems are at maximum equivalent to human“memory”,and it is impossible to have the“retention”ability in inner time consciousness.

关 键 词：思维的电影机制 滞留 连续性 

分 类 号：B023[哲学宗教—哲学理论]