新冠肺炎疫情防控财政资金审计研究  

Research on the Audit of Financial Funds for the Prevention and Control of COVID-19

作　　者：刘骅[1] 吴丹 Liu Hua;Wu Dan

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学金融学院,南京211815

出　　处：《公共财政研究》2020年第2期32-46,共15页Public Finance Research Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“地方政府隐性债务‘灰犀牛’风险的协同审计治理研究”(18BGL054);江苏省高校优势学科三期“南京审计大学应用经济学”(苏政办发〔2018〕87号)阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：我国此次新冠肺炎疫情防控财政资金审计时间紧,任务重,环境特殊,且社会关注度高。本文针对疫情防控财政资金审计中应急手段单一,资源协同不足的现状与问题,运用基于有限理性假设的演化博弈理论,构建疫情防控财政资金审计演化博弈模型,对审计机关与被审单位策略选择的演化稳定性进行分析。在此基础上设计演化博弈系统动力学模型,模拟仿真博弈主体的行为互动关系,同时引入应急成本系数与协同收益系数,研究结果表明:降低审计机关应急管理成本和提高资源协同收益均能增强疫情防控财政资金审计效度。最后,结合审计署“两统筹”要求,从优化审计项目流程与协同审计组织方式两个层面,凝练提升疫情防控财政资金审计效果的政策组合。The audit of financial funds for the prevention and control of COVID-19 has a tight schedule,a heavy task,a special environment and a high level of social attention.In view of the current situation and problems of single emergency means and insufficient coordination of resources in the audit of financial funds for epidemic prevention and control,this paper constructs the evolutionary game model of financial fund audit of epidemic prevention and control by using the evolutionary game theory based on the limited rational hypothesis,and analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategic choice of audit institutions and auditees.On this basis,the dynamic model of evolutionary game system is designed to simulate the interaction of game players,and then the coefficient of emergency cost and cooperative benefit is introduced to simulate the influence of emergency management factors and resource cooperative factors on the outcome of evolutionary game.Finally,combining the requirements of the national audit office for“Two Overall Plans”,the policy combination to improve the validity of financial fund audit for epidemic prevention and control should be improved from the aspects of optimizing the audit project process and coordinating the audit organization.

关 键 词：疫情防控 财政审计 演化博弈 系统仿真 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]