保险法损失补偿原则规范功能之重塑——以“禁止得利”向“充分补偿”之学说演进为中心  被引量:8

Reconstruction of the Function of the Indemnity Principle in Insurance Law--Centering on the evolution of the theory from"prohibiting unjust profiting"to"full indemnity"

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作  者:康雷闪[1] KANG Lei-shan

机构地区:[1]中国石油大学(华东)法学系

出  处:《保险研究》2020年第3期79-88,共10页Insurance Studies

基  金:2019年度中央高校基本科研业务费项目“财产保险理赔中损失补偿原则研究”(项目编号:19CX04021B)

摘  要:损失补偿原则的规范功能具有"二元性",即禁止被保险人不当得利和充分填补被保险人的损失。但在传统保险法理论和实践中,为了达到防范道德风险的功能,损失补偿原则完全被禁止不当得利原则所取代。随着保险技术与保险观念的进步,传统理论下的保险制度难以满足被保险人充分补偿需求并容易造成保险合同效率的低下,因此损失补偿原则规范之重心应完成从"禁止得利"向"充分补偿"的转变。在制度设计及保险合同中,应恰当缩减合同条款对补偿金额的限制、重视发展重置成本保险、重复保险中应完成分摊中按份责任向连带责任之转变、优先实现被保险人的剩余损害赔偿请求权,以更全面保障被保险人的利益。The function of the indemnity principle has a"duality"nature,which prohibits the insured from unjustly profiting and fully compensate for the insured’s losses.However,in the traditional insurance law theories and practices,in order to achieve the function of preventing moral hazard,the indemnity principle is completely replaced by the prohibiting unjust profiting principle.With the progress of insurance technology and insurance concept,the insurance system under the traditional theory is difficult to meet the insured’s demand for full indemnity and is easy to cause low efficiency of insurance contracts.Therefore,the focus of the indemnity principle should be transformed from"prohibiting unjust profiting"to"full indemnity".In the system design and insurance contract,it is necessary to reduce the limitation of compensation amount in contract terms,pay attention to the development of replacement cost insurance,transform repeated insurance from share liability into joint liability,and give priority to the insured s claim for residual damages,so as to protect the interests of the insured more comprehensively.

关 键 词:损失补偿原则 规范功能 禁止得利 充分补偿 

分 类 号:DF438.4[政治法律—经济法学]

 

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