改革开放以来集体林权制度改革的分权演化博弈分析  

The Decentralization of Collective Forestland Tenure Reform in China Since the Reform and Opening-up from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：刘璨 Liu Can

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学经济管理学院 [2]国家林业和草原局经济发展研究中心

出　　处：《中国农村经济》2020年第5期21-38,共18页Chinese Rural Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“1978年以来集体林产权制度及相关林业政策对森林资源与木材供给的影响研究:基于长期大样本动态效率视角”(编号:71673066);国家自然科学基金“改革开放40年来我国集体林产权制度及相关林业政策对农户林业生产要素配置及其收入影响:基于多层次长期大样本动态路径”(编号:71873043)的项目资助。

摘　　要：在维护国家生态安全和农户生计等方面,中国集体林发挥着不可或缺的重要作用。改革开放以来,中国政府启动了多轮集体林权制度改革,本文采用分权多中心决策主体演化博弈理论,研究了集体林权制度变迁的动态过程。分权多中心决策主体的观念改变是集体林权制度改革的前提,分权多中心决策主体采取功能、权力、自适应学习和同构等形式,开展了集体林权制度改革的重复演化博弈,中央政府为多轮集体林权制度改革的主要介入者,集体林权制度改革所呈现的间歇性均衡和多重均衡是分权多中心决策主体持续演化博弈的结果。Collective forestland has been playing a critical role in ecological restoration and maintaining livelihood of local rural households in China.Since the reform and opening-up,the Chinese government has launched several rounds of collective forestland tenure reform.This article adopts the evolutionary game theory of multi-decision-makers in the context of decentralization and devolution to analyze the dynamic process of collective forestland tenure reform from the viewpoints of functionality,power,isomorphism and adaptive learning to take repeated evolutionary games.Beliefs in multi-decision-makers in the context of decentralization and devolution were the preconditions for the reforms of collective forestland tenure.Central government agencies were the critical stakeholders in the multi-round collective forestland tenure reforms.Multi-equilibriums and co-existence of multi-types of collective forestland tenures were the consequences of continuous evolutionary games of multi-decision-makers in the context of decentralization and devolution.

关 键 词：集体林权制度 产权制度变迁 林地权属 分权多中心决策主体 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F326.20[经济管理—产业经济]