Project Matching and Overcapacity in China  

作　　者：Lixue Wu Cheng Liu 

机构地区：[1]Institute of Industrial Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences(CASS),Beijing 100836,China [2]National Academy of Economic Strategy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences(CASS),Beijing 100028,China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities》2019年第4期629-659,共31页中国高等学校学术文摘·经济学（英文版）

基　　金：the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71203233);the Young Scientists Fund of the National Social Science Fund of China(No.16CJY036).

摘　　要：Based on the features of China's project investment,we consider the formation of production capacity as a matching behavior between local governments and investment enterprises.Using the search and matching model,we illustrate that the excess capacity in China mainly results from the asymmetry between the gains from and contribution to the project matching:The capacity will be excessive when the proportion of local governments' return exceeds its contribution to the project,and the more unbalanced the return-contribution relationship,the more severe the overcapacity.Meanwhile,we test this theoretical prediction based on a quasi-natural experiment:the reform of administrative approval system.The empirical results show that the reduction of the local governments' return-contribution ratio will significantly raise the capacity utilization rate and mitigate the overcapacity.Industry-specific regression results further indicate that governments' return-contribution asymmetry is more prominent in industries dominated by state-owned enterprises,high-monopoly industries,heavy industries,and industries with serious overcapacity.This paper offers a novel mechanism of overcapacity,a theoretical criterion for judging optimal capacity,and some new regulatory tools with the micro foundation.

关 键 词：OVERCAPACITY project matching local government reform of administrative approval system 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]