B2B2C平台中的需求信息隐藏行为及合作模式研究  

Joint Selling Strategies for B2B2C Platform with Asymmetric Demand Information

作　　者：李飞燕 孙燕红[1] LI Fei-yan;SUN Yan-hong(SHU-UTS SILC Business School,Shanghai University,Shanghai 201899,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学悉尼工商学院,上海201800

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2020年第8期1-11,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金委面上项目(71671108);上海市“晨光计划”人才项目(15CG47)。

摘　　要：针对B2B2C模式下电商平台与第三方商户之间既合作又竞争的交互关系及其导致的机会主义行为展开研究.通过构建平台和第三方商户在两种典型模式(自营、它营)下的竞合交互模型,研究了第三方商户隐藏需求信息的动机及影响,并探讨了合营模式在规避机会主义行为及增加渠道收益方面的有效性.研究结果表明:①产品需求量较高的第三方商户在面临平台自营威胁时有隐藏需求信息的动机,最终导致双方收益受损;②合营模式能够解决第三方商户的需求隐藏问题,并为平台和第三方商户带来整体收益的增加;③平台针对销售不同需求量产品的进驻方应该选择不同的销售模式,即高需求产品采用自营模式,中需求采用合营模式,较低需求采用它营模式.For a B2 B2 C platform that combines the direct selling and agency selling,there exist both cooperation and competition(i.e.,co-opetition) interactions between the platform and the third-party seller.This paper studies the effectiveness of joint selling strategy in increasing channel revenue and in avoiding the opportunistic behavior caused by co-opetition in a B2B2C platform.Based on a theoretical model that consists of a platform and a third-party seller,the decision interactions and the motivation of information concealing are first explored,and then the effectiveness of joint selling in increasing channel revenue is further examined.Theoretical results show that:(1) the third-party seller with long-tail products has the motivation to conceal demand information,which ultimately leads to the loss of profits for both himself and the platform;(2) joint selling can avoid the behavior of information concealing and thus increase the channel revenue;(3) it is beneficial for the platform to choose direct selling mode for long-tail products,joint selling mode for middle-tail products and agency selling mode for short-tail products.

关 键 词：B2B2C平台 竞争与合作 信息不对称 合营模式 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济]