Attack on an Efficient Certificateless Aggregate Signature without Pairing  

作　　者：LI Huimin LIANG Hongmei WANG Haimin ZHANG Jinhui 

机构地区：[1]School of Mathematics and Finance,Putian University,Putian 351100,Fujian,China [2]Key Laboratory of Applied Mathematics,Fujian Province University(Putian University),Putian 351100,Fujian,China [3]School of Mathematics and Statistics,Minnan Normal University,Zhangzhou 363000,Fujian,China

出　　处：《Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences》2020年第2期139-145,共7页武汉大学学报（自然科学英文版）

基　　金：Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(61373140,61170246);the Program for Innovative Research Team in Science and Technology in Fujian Province University and 2018 Scientific Research and Innovation Special Project of Putian University(2018ZP11,2018ZP12);the Opening Project of Key Laboratory of Financial Mathematics of Fujian Province University(Putian University)(JR201806);Educational Research Projects of Young and Middle-aged Teachers in Fujian Education Department(JT180487)。

摘　　要：A Certificateless Aggregate Signature(CLAS) scheme was proposed by Qu and Mu recently, which was published in "Int J. Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, 2018, 10(2)". They used discrete logarithm to ensure the scheme's security. However,we show by formulating an attack that their CLAS scheme cannot defend against Type I adversary. Furthermore, we point out an error that exists in the signature simulation of their security proof.After that we give a correct signature simulation for the security proof. Finally, to resist the Type I attack, we present two methods for improving Qu et al's CLAS scheme. Moreover, the second improving method can elevate the trust level of Qu et al's CLAS scheme to the highest trust level: Level 3.

关 键 词：CERTIFICATELESS aggregate signature ATTACK SECURITY random oracle model discrete logarithm problem 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]