因特网约车平台双边报价交易机制创新及策略研究  

A Bilateral Bidding Mechanism for Cloud-Based On-Demand Transport Services

作　　者：周乐欣 徐海平 李烨[1] ZHOU Le-xin;XU Hai-ping;LI Ye(College of Management,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China;Computer and Information Science Department,University of Massachusetts Dartmouth,Dartmouth 02747,USA)

机构地区：[1]贵州大学管理学院,贵阳贵州550025 [2]马萨诸塞大学达特茅斯分校工程学院计算与信息科学系,达特茅斯马萨诸塞州02747 [3]马萨诸塞大学达特茅斯分校工程学院,达特茅斯马萨诸塞州02747

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2020年第3期201-212,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71461003);贵州省国内一流学科建设资助项目(GNYL[2017]005)。

摘　　要：现有网约车平台采用接受或拒绝的定价交易机制,即乘客和司机被动选择接受或拒绝交易平台给出的定价及加价规则。由于缺乏对平台用户个体需求的了解,当前平台产生的价格不能反映不同交易者的内在诉求,如每个乘客的用车目的、紧急程度、经济能力,司机的实际运行成本、期望收益等差异。由于每个交易者的内在诉求对每笔交易的合理定价具有很大影响,为优化资源配置,将这类信息纳入网约用车市场价格形成机制变得越来越重要。本文设计了基于网约车平台的双边报价交易机制,该机制允许乘客和司机分别进行报价,网约车平台基于每次交易涉及的乘客及司机的报价自动生成交易价格并实现乘客与司机的交易匹配,该机制满足参与理性约束、预算平衡约束,保障乘客和司机获得该机制作用下的所有交易剩余,文章还对该机制下交易人的报价策略及投机策略进行了理性及仿真分析,证明该机制鼓励交易者说真话,从而优化平台资源配置。Cloud-based on-demand transport service marketplaces are usually based on the take-it-or-leave-it trading mechanism,where passengers and drivers can only accept or reject prices offered by the systems.Due to a lack of consideration for user requirements in such systems,system-generated prices do not necessarily reflect different situations of the traders,such as a passenger’s urgency degree,the actual running cost,and a driver’s expected profit.Since private information related to user requirements is incredibly valuable for determiningthe reasonable prices of trips,to design a trading mechanism for transport services utilizing such information become increasingly important.In this paper,a bilateral auction mechanism is produced for cloud-based on-demand transport service markets,where passengers and drivers are allowed to submit their bidsindependently.Our approach takes both passengers’and drivers’personal valuation of transport services into consideration.When a trip distance is less than a maximal distance determined by the market maker,an initial rate with a fixed fee is applied;otherwise,a passenger must pay by a unit priceno less than the price charged by a driver.Two rounds of bidding processes is considered:bidding for the initial rate and bidding for the unit price.In either round,trading price is determined p*that is used by all winnersof an auction.For example,in the second round,suppose we have n passengers with bidding prices bi,i=1,2,…,n,and m drivers is sorted with bidding prices sj,j=1,2,…,m.The bidding prices of passengers and drivers into b1≥b2≥…≥bn and s1≤s2≤…≤sm,respectively.Then it is found the positive integer k,called the efficient number of trades,that satisfies the requirements of bk≥skand bk+1<sk+1,where 1≤k≤min(m,n).The lower bound price is defined as lb=max(sk,bk+1)and the upper bound price is defined as ub=min(bk,sk+1).The trading price can be determined as p*=(lb+ub)/2.Since there must be an overlapping between the two ranges[sk,bk]and[bk+1,sk+1],it

关 键 词：网约车平台 双边报价 占优策略 诚实报价 投机策略 

分 类 号：F570.5[经济管理—产业经济] C934[经济管理—管理学]