基于司机过度自信的网约车平台最优补贴契约设计与选择  

Design and Selection of Optimal Subsidy Contract for Transportation Network Companies Based on Overconfidence of Ride-hailing Drivers

作　　者：雷丽彩[1] 高尚 LEI Li-cai;GAO Shang(Business School, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411105, China;School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China)

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《预测》2020年第3期74-81,共8页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71401150);教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(19YJA630030);湖南省教育厅优秀青年基金资助项目(17B267);湖南省社会科学基金资助项目(17YBA369)。

摘　　要：本文将司机的过度自信倾向引入委托代理模型,分析网约车平台最优补贴契约设计的影响因素。同时,通过理论推导与数值算例,对比分析与完全理性情况下的结果差异,得到以下结论:司机对网约车市场不利条件的过度自信会对司机从事网约车服务的积极性产生负面影响,而有利条件下的过度自信有利于激励司机努力程度和乘客使用意愿的同步提高,并且最终实现网约车平台乃至市场整体较高的收益水平。而且,司机一定程度的过度自信水平会对网约车平台的补贴行为产生正面影响,而网约车平台的补贴契约可对司机努力程度和乘客使用意愿形成诱导,由此,在设计网约车合理的补贴契约和成果分享机制时,考虑司机过度自信倾向及市场环境相关因素的影响,将使得结论更贴近现实。This paper analyzes the factors that affect optimal contract design of the TNCs by bringing the drivers’overconfidence into the principal-agent model.Compared with the complete rationality circumstances,theoretical derivation and simulation results indicate that the drivers’overconfidence on adverse ride-hailing conditions is harmful to drivers engaging in ride-hailing service.On the contrary,the drivers’overconfidence on favorable ride-hailing conditions will simultaneously motivate the improvement both drivers’effort level and passengers’willingness.The TNCs and the ride-hailing industry as a whole will eventually achieve a higher level of income.Moreover,a certain degree of the drivers’overconfidence will have a positive impact on TNCs’subsidy behavior.In turn,subsidy contract can develop induction for drivers’effort level and passengers’willingness.Consequently,drivers’overconfidence tendency and environmental factors related to ride-hailing service should be considered in the process of designing reasonable subsidy contract and revenue-sharing mechanism.It will make the conclusions closer to reality.

关 键 词：网约车平台 补贴契约 过度自信 委托代理 计算实验 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]