演化博弈视角下废旧共享单车回收合作机制研究  

Cooperation Mechanism of Recycling Waste Shared Bikes Based on Evolutionary Games

作　　者：王中秋 WANG Zhongqiu(School of Economics and Management,Zhejiang Sci-Tech University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《物流科技》2020年第6期69-75,共7页Logistics Sci-Tech

摘　　要：共享单车的横空出世让人们出行更加便利,随之出现的投放过量、乱停乱放等现象引起的废旧单车数量剧增,使得共享单车的生态系统遭遇严重危机。当前,政府呼吁企业、民众积极参与废旧单车的回收利用,选择低碳环保型共享单车,但是效果仍然不尽如意。为了揭示这个现象所蕴含的形成机制,探索废旧共享单车的有效回收利用策略,考虑政府对单车制造商和平台运营商监督和奖惩的影响力,建立了政府、制造商和平台之间的三方非对称演化博弈模型,分析政府、制造商与平台投入行为的演化稳定策略。通过模拟实验发现,政府、制造商和平台商的博弈以及行为决策取决于自身收益。当三者收益发生变化时,将出现多种演化稳定策略;如果制造商和平台的背叛收益过大的时候,双方选择"合作"的可能性会大大降低;政府积极调整奖惩力度,对"搭便车"的行为进行处罚,有利于系统向理想状态模式演化。这些结论对于制定废旧共享单车回收利用具有重要的理论指导意义。The emergence of shared bicycles has made people’s travel more convenient, and the number of waste bicycles caused by the excessive release, random parking, and other chaotic phenomena, which has caused a serious crisis in the ecosystem of shared bicycles. At present, the government calls on enterprises and people to actively participate in the recycling of used bicycles and choose low-carbon and environmentally-friendly shared bicycles. However, the effect is still not satisfactory. In order to reveal the driving mechanism behind this phenomenon, explore the effective recycling strategy of used and shared bicycles, and consider the influence of the government on the supervision and rewards and punishments of bicycle manufacturers and platform operators. A three-party asymmetric evolutionary game model between government, manufacturer and platform is established to analyze the evolutionary stability strategy of government, manufacturer and platform input behavior. Through simulation experiments, it is found that the behavior decisions of the government, manufacturers and platform vendors depend on their own benefits. When the income of the three changes, a variety of evolutionary stabilization strategies will emerge;if the betrayal gains of manufacturers and platforms are too large, the possibility of the parties choosing"cooperation"will be greatly reduced;the government actively adjusts the rewards and punishments, punishes the behavior of the hitchhiker is conducive to the evolution of the system to the ideal state mode. These conclusions have important theoretical guiding significance for the development of recycling and recycling of shared bicycles.

关 键 词：演化博弈 三方博弈 共享单车 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F713.2[经济管理—产业经济]