竞争环境下制造商激励共享供应商创新的决策研究  

The decision on stimulating shared-supplier innovation under competition

作　　者：刘丛 黄卫来[1] 杨超[1] 任鸣鸣[2] Liu Cong;HuangWeilai;Yang Chao;Ren Mingming(School of Management,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China;Business School,Henan Normal University,Xinxiang 453007,China)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]河南师范大学商学院,河南新乡453007

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2020年第1期105-119,共15页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金国际合作重大资助项目(71320107001);国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL139);河南省高等学校哲学社会科学应用研究重大资助项目(2017-YYZD-10).

摘　　要：构建了制造商激励共享供应商创新的成本分担博弈模型,研究了存在两个竞争性制造商和一个共享供应商的供应链结构中,制造商合作与非合作的互动行为对激励共享供应商创新决策的影响问题.研究表明:当市场竞争程度较低时,制造商合作时提供的成本分担比例高于非合作的情形,此时供应商的创新水平和制造商利润也高于非合作情形;当市场竞争程度较高时,制造商合作时提供的成本分担比例低于制造商非合作时的情形,但供应商的创新水平和制造商利润依然高于制造商非合作时的情形;制造商的合作行为降低了市场竞争对制造商与供应商博弈时的消极影响.By using a cost-sharing game model,this paper investigates how interaction behaviors of manufacturers’cooperation and non-cooperation influence the decisions of motivating shared-supplier innovation in a supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and a shared-supplier.The results show that when the competition degree of market is low,the cost-sharing ratio,the shared-supplier’s innovation level and the manufacturers’profit when the manufacturers collaborate are higher than when they do not.When the market competition degree is high,though the cost-sharing ratio provided in the case of cooperation is less relative to non-cooperation,the innovation level and profitability of the supplier are higher relative to noncooperation.The cooperative behaviors of manufacturers decrease the negative effect of market competition on the game.

关 键 词：市场竞争 激励 成本分担合同 共享供应商 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]