GDP增速的结构性下调:官员考核机制的视角  

Structural Decline in the GDP Growth Rate:The Impact of the Official Assessment Mechanism

作　　者：张军[1,2] 樊海潮[1,3,4] 许志伟 周龙飞[1,2] ZHANG Jun;FAN Haichao;XU Zhiwei;ZHOU Longfei(School of Economics,Fudan University;China Center for Economic Studies,Fudan University;Institute of World Economy,School of Economics,Fudan University;Shanghai Institute of International Finance and Economics;Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院 [2]复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心,200433 [3]复旦大学经济学院世界经济研究所 [4]复旦大学上海国际金融与经济研究院,200433 [5]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,200030

出　　处：《经济研究》2020年第5期31-48,共18页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：2013年,中组部对地方官员考核体系作出了结构性调整,明确提出弱化GDP增速的考核权重,同时加强环境保护等方面的考核。特征事实显示,考核指标的变化对地方政府投资行为产生了重要影响,地方政府通过投资拉动经济增速的动力出现明显降低。本文随后构建了一个具有地方政府竞争行为的动态一般均衡模型,并定量分析官员考核如何通过改变地方政府投资来影响经济增长和社会福利。定量分析表明:地方政府竞争会显著放大地区间外溢效应;当以GDP增速为考核指标时,某地增速调整会通过地方政府投资和地区间竞争对各地区的经济增长产生重要影响;当主要考核指标转变为环境保护时,各地区的实际经济增速均会经历结构性下调,但指标转变对受到外生冲击的地区产生的负面影响更大。福利分析表明,社会福利与环保力度呈倒U型关系,因而存在最优环保力度。本文基于官员考核机制转变的研究为理解近年来中国经济增速变化提供了一个新的视角。China's official governance features a system called the“promotion tournament”,under which relative assessments are elementary to the promotion of governmental officials.Better performance in the assessment by an official means a higher chance of being promoted.For a long time,the GDP growth rate outweighed other indicators in the assessment.As a result,local government officials focused on the prosperity of the local economy and were reluctant to engage in areas not covered by the assessment indicators.Local officials were especially disincentivized to pursue policies such as environmental protection policies that could harm GDP growth.A fundamental change in the assessment system occurred in 2013.As affirmed by the central government,the regional GDP and its growth rate are no longer the only assessment indicators:more comprehensive indicators including resource consumption,environmental damage and ecological benefits are now included.A cooling down in local governments enthusiasm for GDP growth is also seen around 2013.We use these two facts as our identification mechanism.We speculate that placing more weight on the environmental protection indicators results in a decline in public investment and a possible plunge in local economic growth.To test this hypothesis,we collect the target growth rate for GDP and fixed asset investments proposed by the provincial and municipal governments from the annual government work reports.We find that the target GDP growth rate,the fixed asset investments and the gap between the two decline significantly after 2013,indicating a weakening of the blind pursuit of economic growth through the investments of local governments after 2013.Using panel data from 2004 to 2016,we find that the GDP growth rate is the dominant indicator in a government official s assessment before 2013.From 2013 onward,the weight on the environmental protection indicators increases considerably.To further study the impact of these changes in the assessment on economic growth,we introduce a dynamic gen

关 键 词：政府竞争 官员考核 经济增长 环境保护 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]