机构地区:[1]南京大学经济学院,210093 [2]清华大学社会科学学院经济所博士生,100084
出 处:《经济研究》2020年第5期166-182,共17页Economic Research Journal
基 金:国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA024);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71873062,71473115);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71903086);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(19YJC790024)的资助。
摘 要:在新型城镇化高质量发展阶段,亟需对政府主导的“中国式”城镇化的福利效应进行量化评估。本文基于拓展的Rosen-Roback模型构建中国城镇居民福利变动的核算框架,匹配2000年、2010年和2017年中国271个地级市数据,对2000—2017年城镇居民的福利变动及其影响因素进行结构估计。结果显示:2000—2017年中国城镇居民福利增长了370.92%,其中2010年较2000年增长240.83%,2017年较2010年增长38.17%。分因素看,生产率、人均建设用地、公共服务支出效率、政府发展偏向这四类因素对福利增量的贡献率分别为69.35%、19.88%、9.64%、1.13%。其中,2010—2017年公共服务支出效率的贡献率较2000—2010年上升约23个百分点,城镇化的动力由“生产率、土地供给双轮驱动”向“生产率、土地供给与公共服务支出效率三方面协同驱动”演进。分地区看,东部地区城镇化体现出协同驱动的特征,中部地区则缺乏土地要素的支持,西部和东北地区在2010年后呈现公共服务主导的特征,但地方政府发展偏向的转变导致福利损失12.13%。进一步的反事实分析显示,地方政府间公共服务支出效率均等化是改善居民福利、提升GDP的有效手段。China has witnessed both an economic miracle and rapid and extensive urbanization.By the end of 2018,China had a GDP exceeding 90 trillion yuan and an urbanization rate close to 60%.Local governments play a central role in the process of urbanization.They can use fiscal policy to promote economic development and can influence urban spatial structure through land policy.However,the objective functions of local governments may differ from those of residents,especially given the long-term GDP-oriented incentive mechanism used to evaluate local officials.Fiscal expenditures on residents welfare could be squeezed out and residents production and living spaces could be impacted because of this.Do urban residents enjoy the benefit of rapid urbanization,or do they fall into the trap of“high growth with low welfare?”To answer this question,we need to evaluate the welfare effects of urbanization and quantify the effect of local governments on residents welfare.Inspired by the characteristics of China's urbanization,we develop a multi-city spatial equilibrium model with three sectors and three factors by introducing the local government into the Rosen-Roback model.To capture the fundamentals of Chinese-style urbanization in detail,several key assumptions are made in the model.First,we assume that part of the local governments fiscal expenditures is used to expand production and the rest is used to provide public services;this second part enters directly into the utility function of residents.Second,we assume that the superior government exogenously controls urban land supply and that the local governments decide the land use structure independently.Finally,we assume that the local governments have differentiated development goals indicated by the different financial expenditures and land use structures.In our model,the determinants of welfare and urbanization are decomposed into four components:total factor productivity(TFP),urban land supply,efficiency of fiscal expenditures on public service and development preference
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