绿蓝悖论的证据路径消解方案  

The Evidence Approach to Grue Paradox

作　　者：顿新国[1,2] DUN Xin-guo(Philosophy Department of Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China;The Institute of Modern Logic and Application,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系,南京210023 [2]南京大学现代逻辑与逻辑应用研究所,南京210023

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2020年第3期22-27,共6页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“广义逻辑悖论的历史发展、理论前沿与跨学科应用”(18ZDA031)。

摘　　要：绿蓝悖论在科学哲学、归纳逻辑、形式知识论等领域激起了热烈而持久的讨论,沿着语言论、科学方法论、贝叶斯主义和知识论等路径形成了几十种解决方案。已有研究成果基本上围绕包含绿蓝谓词的绿蓝假说本身之"合法性"展开争论。这些方案认为谓词绿蓝不具可投射性,而包含不可投射谓词的假说是不可投射的,因此这些假说不可被确证,不能根据它们进行预测,从而悖论不会产生。这些方案在解悖技术上很直观明了,但在哲学说明和辩护上遇到极大难题,没有哪一个方案得到学界广泛承认。从确证的另一个关系项证据这一崭新视角来审视绿蓝悖论的构造过程,可以表明古德曼所断言的绿蓝悖论不成立,从而绿蓝悖论被消解;进而对该方案进行辩护,并利用证据路径上的新研究成果佐证绿蓝悖论和确证研究的证据转向这一指认。The grue paradox is a very hot and popular topic in philosophy of science,inductive logic and formal epistemology.Dozens of solutions have been proposed in the approaches of linguistics,scientific methodology,Bayesianism and epistemology.All the solutions and corresponding discussions focused on the“legality”of the Grue hypothesis containing the Grue predicate.According to those solutions,the Grue predicate is unprojectible,and the hypothesis containing unprojectible predicate is also unprojectible.So these hypotheses cannot be confirmed,which means we cannot make predictions according to them.Accordingly,there is no paradox.The techniques of those solutions are simple and clear,but it is difficult to justify them philosophically,thus none of them has been accepted widely.This paper considers the construction of the so-called grue paradox from the view of evidence,and argues the grue paradox that Goodman asserted doesn’t hold.That’s to say,Goodman’s grue paradox is dissolved.The last part of the paper defends this dissolution by quoting latest researches on the paradox,and proposes that the research on grue paradox should shift from the paradigm concentrating on grue hypothesis to the one focusing on the evidence that confirms the hypothesis.

关 键 词：绿蓝悖论 证据 确证悖论 确证 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]