我国分级董事会践行状况与规制路径研究  

The Practice of Classified Board and its Regulatory Path in China

作　　者：林少伟[1] 解军 Lin Shaowei;Xie Jun

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学民商法学院,重庆401120 [2]西南政法大学商会法律研究院,重庆401120

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2020年第6期32-40,共9页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“《公司法》私人执行之检视”(编号:17CFX072);霍英东教育基金(编号:171079)。

摘　　要："宝万之争"以来,诸多公司在章程中引入各种反收购措施。其中,分级董事会条款已被多家上市公司采用,使收购方即便取得目标公司足够股份也无法马上入主董事会获得实质控制权,在很大程度上增加了收购方的收购成本并延缓收购进程。但我国对分级董事会并未作出明确规定,实践中上市公司对分级董事会条款的移植运用与域外传统制度貌合神离。通过检视立法的缺位、学理的争议、实践的混乱及由此产生的法律风险,本文提出,我国应当确立分级董事会条款的效力审查标准,提高设置分级董事会条款的表决比例,设立不得无故罢免董事的规则,以及增加累积投票制的配套规定,以构建符合我国国情的分级董事会制度。Since the“Battle of Bao and Wan”,a lot of companies have been“preparing for the rain”by implanting various antiacquisition measures in the articles of association.Classified board provisions have been adopted by many listed companies as one of the anti-acquisition mechanisms.Even if sufficient shares of the target company are obtained,acquirers cannot immediately enter the main board of directors to acquire substantial control.Therefore,the acquisition cost of the acquirer is greatly increased and the acquisition process is delayed.However,China has not made clear regulations on the classified board.In practice,the transplantation of the terms of the classified board by listed companies is inconsistent with the traditional system outside the territory.The absence of legislation,academic disputes,and confusion in practice have led to the grading of board terms between legal and illegal for a long time.In view of this,it is necessary to review the practice of classified board in China.On the basis of sorting out and evaluating related theories,we propose that China should establish standards for reviewing the effectiveness of the terms of classified board,improve the voting proportionof the terms,set up rules that do not remove directors for no reason,and construct a cumulative voting system,aiming to build a classified board system suitable for China’s circumstances.

关 键 词：分级董事会 反收购 累积投票制 董事罢免 制度构建 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]