风险投资控制权分配与企业家激励:基于质量努力和管理努力的视角  

Control rights allocation and entrepreneur incentives in venture capital: A perspective based on quality effort and management effort

作　　者：丁川[1] 李爱民 Ding Chuan;Li Aimin(School of Economic Mathematics,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 610074,Sichuan,China)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学经济数学学院,四川成都610074

出　　处：《科研管理》2020年第5期213-230,共18页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目:“公平偏好下风险投资的阶段投资策略,股权分配和企业家努力:理论,模型与实证检验”(71671142.2017.01-2020.12);国家自然科学基金青年项目:“连续时间委托代理模型下的风险投资动态激励机制研究:基于动态控制的研究方法”(71701164,2018.01-2020.12)。

摘　　要：企业家的努力对项目的现金流有着重要的影响,本文将企业家的努力分为质量努力和管理努力,并基于此研究了企业家控制、风险投资家控制和条件控制这三种控制权安排中的效率问题。通过建模研究表明:(1)企业家拥有控制权的合同很难达到社会有效率,再谈判虽然能保证企业家控制事前、事后有效率,但再谈判不总是可行的,而且再谈判成本也会造成效率流失;(2)风险投资家拥有控制权时,如果风险投资家获得的支付大于好状态下的清算值,那么合同是社会有效率的,如果风险投资家获得的支付不大于好状态下的清算值,那么合同事前激励为零,事后无效率,最终项目必然清算,股权分配虽然能解决风险投资家控制下的事后无效率并扩大融资范围,但这以牺牲事前效率为代价;(3)条件控制权安排总是社会有效率;(4)风险投资家的保留效用会决定项目的均衡控制权安排,如果风险投资家的保留效用高于一阶努力水平下的社会最优福利,风险投资家控制是均衡的控制权安排;当风险投资家的保留效用小于或等于一阶努力水平下的社会最优福利时,如果再谈判成本趋近于0,则企业家控制是均衡的控制权安排,如果再谈判成本不是无穷小量,则条件控制是均衡的控制权安排。Entrepreneur′s efforts have an important impact on cash flow of project. On the one hand, a start-up entrepreneur would spend effort and energy to develop or even produce products. On the other hand, the entrepreneur will also spare no effort to deal with project-related affairs and manage the project. Limited source of finance always impels start-up entrepreneurs to seek for venture capitalists. These entrepreneur′s efforts, which are the key factors to determine whether the project will be successful or not, thus arouse much attention from venture capitalists when sign a contract and allocate control rights with entrepreneurs. This paper differentiates between these efforts and divides them into quality efforts and management efforts, and then studies the efficiency of three kinds of control allocations, including entrepreneur control, venture capitalist control and contingent control. The results of the theoretical models show that:(1) contracts that allow the entrepreneur to own the rights of control are hard to achieve social efficiency;though renegotiation can ensure that entrepreneur control is efficient beforehand and afterwards, however, renegotiation is not always feasible, even when it is, the cost of renegotiation would lead to loss of efficiency;(2) when the venture capitalist has the rights of control, and if the venture capitalist gets paid more than the liquidation value under good condition, then the contract is socially efficient;if on the opposite, the venture capitalist never obtains payment greater than such liquidation value, then the contract has no incentive beforehand, nor efficiency afterwards, what is more, the final project would inevitably face liquidation;equity allocation can solve the problem of inefficient investment under venture capitalist control afterwards and greatly expands the scope of financing, however, this is at the expense of the ex-ante efficiency;(3) the contingent control rights allocation is always socially efficient;(4) reservation utility of the venture capit

关 键 词：风险投资 质量努力 管理努力 控制权安排 合同 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]